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ABSTRACT 
Alison S. Tomas: Legitimacy, Success and Rebellion in Chechnya: The Rise and Fall of Chechen 
Independence 
(Under the direction of Eren Tasar) 
 
 This paper traces rebel legitimacy in Chechnya from 1990-2007 to determine the impact 
of heightened legitimacy on rebel outcomes of success. The findings of this analysis suggest that 
the ability of Chechen rebels to obtain legitimacy amongst national political elites, the 
international community, and the local population contributed significantly to the movement’s 
ability to access resources, networks, and materials that contributed to the movement’s initial 
success in the early 1990’s. Consequently, reduced legitimacy in the later years of the rebellion 
facilitated challenges to rebel ability to access materials and avenues that support successful 
rebellion outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The protracted conflict in Chechnya is commonly framed as the unfortunate rise of 
extremism in a peripheral, uncontrollable region of Russia1. The conflict remains a complex, 
deeply engrained phenomenon that in recent years has produced thousands of casualties, and 
created a sense of lawlessness in the Russian oblast2. Although Chechens have rebelled for 
decades against tsarist, Soviet, and Russian power, repeat rebellions have ultimately failed to 
secure positive outcomes for Chechen independence3. Possibly the most successful rebellion, 
was the one led by Dudayev in the 1990’s, which resulted in Chechen separatist de facto control 
of the territory. The success of this rebellion, however, was short lived, ending after less than two 
decades at the hands of a crushing counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign launched by the newly 
established Russian state4. While Russian anti-rebellion methods have produced positive results 
by war terms, rebellion remains, and Russia has, ultimately, still failed to secure its own 
legitimacy in Chechnya5.  
This paper seeks to examine the effects of legitimacy on rebel success, to better understand 
legitimacy’s role and weight in influencing rebellion. If rebellion can be understood as “a fight 
for control of political space”6 against a legitimate power, then the rebellion in Chechnya can be 
understood as the Chechen separatists’ attempts to assume control of official political space in 
Chechnya, that was previously occupied by the Soviet Union. Rebel legitimacy requires 
recognition by states, civilians, and institutions that the rebel group is the more appropriate actor 
for receiving political support, engaging in political negotiations, and controlling political 
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territory than the state actor7. The ability or failure of rebel groups to obtain legitimacy from 
external actors can determine the avenues of access open to rebel groups to obtain success.  
Traditional definitions of rebellion perceive conflict as the open, armed opposition or 
resistance to the rule of a legitimate government power8. These definitions paint a relatively clear 
picture of the what constitutes rebel conflict against state actors. The picture of political 
legitimacy, however, is less clear as the subjective determination, contextual realities, and 
opinions of state, external, and civilian actors are needed to fully portray rebel legitimacy9. 
Bringing legitimacy into the rebellion context is important for several reasons. First, 
examining legitimacy dynamics in rebel conflicts allows for a wider understanding of the 
ideological drivers of rebel activity, objectives, and support networks. Second, examining 
rebellion through legitimacy allows for a neutral evaluation of rebel actors, supporters, and 
motivations outside of traditional state-rebel roles, where states are assumed to hold legitimate 
power, and rebels are assumed to lack such power. Third, assessing legitimacy in rebellion 
allows for a deeper unraveling of actor involvement, roles, and allegiances. Looking at rebellion 
through a legitimacy lens warrants an examination of attitudes, ideologies, and perspectives of 
actors involved in the rebellion that can provide insight into their intentions, justifications, and 
means for supporting or failing to support rebels. 
Despite the importance of legitimacy in understanding rebellion and insurgency, 
legitimacy literature in rebellion contexts is underdeveloped. Bruce Gilley (2011) conducted a 
statistical analysis to assess the strength of a correlation between 100 indicators expected to 
provide state legitimacy and cumulative perceptions of state legitimacy. Study findings indicated 
that states with active rebel conflict were significantly more likely to host low legitimacy 
indexes10. Similar evaluations of legitimacy in rebel groups have not been examined, but could 
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provide substantial insight into domestic insurgency dynamics. In particular, such analyses could 
provide deeper examination into the interplay between rebel and state legitimacy, and how 
legitimacy contributes to rebel and state capacity and success. The lack of research on rebel 
legitimacy leaves gaps in understanding the impacts of rebel legitimacy on both rebel and state 
roles in conflicts.  
Current literature also lacks a definitive analysis of how varying levels of rebel 
legitimacy affect rebellion outcomes. Absence of such analysis reduces the effectiveness of 
claims that legitimacy is an important aspect of rebel dynamics or outcomes. This research 
supports claims that legitimacy is beneficial to rebel groups, by showing that rebel groups that 
achieve higher levels of legitimacy are awarded with greater access to legitimate political space, 
resources, and relations with external actors. This paper presents a framework that dissects a 
causational relationship between levels of rebel legitimacy; access to resources, diplomacy, and 
political space; and how access or denial of access to these resources contributes to rebel success. 
This framework is applied to a case study evaluation of the separatist rebellion movement in 
Chechnya from 1990-2007.  
Similarly, legitimacy literature focuses on legitimacy awarded through official avenues, 
namely states and civilians.  This analysis incorporates an evaluation of how non-legitimate 
actors, such as other rebel or insurgent groups, award legitimacy and the difference in effects and 
implications this form of legitimacy provides. 
While legitimacy is not the only contributor of rebel success11, findings from this analysis 
suggest that the presence or absence of legitimacy in rebel groups substantially influences rebel 
capacity to achieve success. Understanding these dynamics helps to clarify why and how certain 
rebel groups are restricted from, or have greater access to different types of resources. Evaluating 
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a causational relationship between the resources legitimacy awards and outcomes on success 
provides insight into how rebel groups harness opportunities to obtain resources and achieve 
success. 
This paper is organized into seven chapters. This paragraph concludes chapter one, which 
provided an overview of the importance, gaps, and need for examining the relationship between 
rebel legitimacy and success. Chapter two reviews existing literature on rebel legitimacy and 
success, and concludes with a detailed description of the analytical methods used in this research. 
Chapters three through six apply the framework detailed in chapter two to the Chechen Rebellion 
from 1990-2007. These chapters evaluate how legitimacy awarded through political space 
(chapter three), external actors (chapter four), civilian support (chapter five), and organizational 
management (chapter six) influenced success and failure in the Chechen rebellion. The paper 
concludes with chapter seven, which summarizes the key arguments and findings of the analysis. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
 This chapter is organized into three sections intended to provide an extensive overview 
of literature, thought, and methodology relevant to this analysis. Section one assesses 
contributions and gaps in current literature on legitimacy in rebel groups. Section two builds on 
contributions and gaps in existing literature on rebel success in conflicts. Section three presents a 
detailed overview of the paper methodology, framework development, and case study 
application. 
The complexity of the perception, measurement, and determination of legitimacy, 
success, and the Chechen context warrants an examination of context from a variety of 
backgrounds. Gaps in literature on legitimacy and Chechnya produced a need to incorporate non-
academic sources to more comprehensively place legitimacy and the Chechen rebellion in 
context. As such, sources were assessed from various sectors, including academic literature, 
counterinsurgency (COIN) manuals, development reports, and policy analyses. 
It is important to note several key challenges in examining literature on Chechnya. First, 
accurate, neutral sources on the Chechen rebellion are limited after 2000. Russia’s restriction of 
media and foreign access to Chechnya in 2000 drastically reduced external access to Chechnya 
and subsequent research, media, and policy analysis coming from the region12. From 2000 to 
2007, state media outlets, rebel propaganda sites, and accounts of foreign humanitarian 
organizations with restricted regional access, produced the vast majority of information on 
Chechnya13.  While limited, these sources can still produce key aspects of information. For 
example, the Chechen extremist site Kavkaz.org is often used by foreign journalists and policy 
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analysts to obtain non-state based information. A Russian journalist notes that, while the 
accounts are exaggerated, they are often based off real events and policies14.  
The second challenge with Chechen sources is an inherent lack of direct civilian 
perspective. The diversity of populations in Chechnya further contributes to the challenge of 
capturing accurate opinions of the Chechen population in its entirety. Military support, elections, 
and media provide some insight into popular opinion from 1990-1998. In his book Chechnya: 
Life in a War-Torn Society, Valerie Tishkov incorporates an ethnographic perspective of 
Chechen life from the initiation to the First Chechen War to early 200015. Civilian perspective is 
largely constrained following 2000 due to two factors. First, Russia’s stronghold on access to the 
region restricted foreign presence, monitoring, and connection with the Chechen population16. 
Second, an established Russian military presence in 2000 and implementation of harsh 
punishments against rebel supporters presents questions into the validity of civilian public 
statements, that may be influenced by fear of reprisal17. 
Legitimacy and Rebellion 
Contemporary literature on rebel legitimacy provides a strong foundation for 
understanding legitimacy’s role in rebellion power dynamics. Rebellions are often understood as 
a struggle between a state that holds power and one or more rebel groups seeking to obtain 
power through achieving legitimate rule18.  Within this dynamic, it can be assumed that when 
one actor gains power or legitimacy, another loses power or legitimacy19. Fearon (1995) argues 
that protracted conflicts occur when neither the state nor rebel actors have the capacity or power 
to achieve victory over the other. In the case of Chechnya, this dynamic is present in the failure 
of the Chechen rebellion to eliminate Russian control at any given point, and Russia’s failure to 
fully eradicate rebel activity. 
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In the context of this argument, legitimacy is defined as the acceptance of an organization’s 
“right to rule” over a designated territory by civilians, social institutions, and political elites. 
Legitimacy is based on several key assumptions. The first assumption is that legitimacy is not 
static and is subject to change depending on insurgent capacity, conflict context, as well as 
population needs and perceptions20. The second, is that legitimacy is multidimensional, occurring 
at all levels of an insurgency, and is the outcome of variety of social, cultural, geographical, 
political, and economic processes21. Third, it is assumed that, while insurgency is a bid for power 
between a rebel group and a state, external actors can influence balances of power between both 
actors. 
This analysis aligns with literary perceptions of rebellion as an inherently political 
movement, with social, ethnic, religious, geographic, and military components22. In seeking 
political power, rebel groups inherently pursue access to political space. Politics, however, 
dictate many other aspects of governance, economic productivity, and social activity. As such, 
legitimate political rule is obtained through non-political avenues in addition to political means23.  
Current literature provides deep insight into the factors that award rebel groups with 
legitimacy. Key arguments of the key factors known to award legitimacy are summarized in the 
following paragraphs in this section. 
Several studies independently evaluate the effects of political practice and support on 
awarding legitimacy to insurgencies. Risa Brooks (2009) analyzed the effects of support from 
established political institutions on insurgency. The analysis concluded that insurgencies with 
support from established political institutions achieve greater levels of legitimacy, which 
translates into greater access to resources, external support and other factors that contribute to 
insurgent sustainability. The study also found that insurgencies receiving support from these 
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institutions achieved higher levels of overall success, and were engaged in longer-lasting 
conflicts, as they had greater capacity to challenge states24. Allen Buchanan (2002) conducted a 
study analyzing the effects of democratic elections and practices (respectively) within insurgent 
organizations as contributors to legitimacy. The study concluded that greater levels of 
democratic practice, exercised through elections and political institutions that on this argument 
by examining the role of democratic elections and institutions of insurgencies25. 
Much has also been written to determine the legitimating effects of negotiations on rebel 
legitimacy. Negotiations can indicate acknowledgement from state or other actors that rebel 
groups are a legitimate force that can participate, dictate, and formulate discussions with 
legitimate actors. Negotiations may entail compromise, interaction, and developing relationships 
between states and insurgent groups26. Two groups of thought dictate negotiation literature: 1) 
that negotiating with rebels provides legitimacy to illegitimate organizations and should be 
avoided at all costs27; and 2) that negotiating with rebels has the potential to support conflict 
resolution and state-building initiatives and should be considered on a case by case basis28. Bapat 
(2001) contributes to negotiation literature by perceiving terrorism as a form of communication, 
used only when all other forms of communication are cut off to the organization. He argues that 
when states end negotiations, incidences of terrorism often rise29.  
Rebel literature also focuses on civilians as significant contributors of legitimacy to rebel 
groups. There are three key factors that most strongly influence civilian support: 1) the ability of 
a state or rebel group to provide goods and services30; 2) violence enacted against civilians31; and 
3) aligned ideology32. Bethany Lacina (2015) made several interesting conclusions regarding the 
role of violence in influencing civilian support. First, civilians favor actors they view as their 
protectors. This perception can be strongly influenced by propaganda and differences in 
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frequency, brutality, and messaging behind acts of violence committed by an actor against 
civilians. Second, civilians favor sides that commit fewer and less brutal acts of violence. Third, 
in instances where both sides are prone to brutal and common acts of violence, civilians favor the 
actor they relate to ideologically33. Another interesting argument for civilian support, made by 
Chowdhury and Krebs (2009), is that legitimacy will only be achieved if an actor’s movement 
and treatment of civilians is based in local context, tradition, and ideological values. Anna 
Zelkina (1993) argues that Russia has ultimately failed to secure legitimate rule in Chechnya, 
because it has not incorporated Chechen realities and identities into Chechen policy. 
Studies by Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin (2007), GSDRC Report (2010), Government 
Counterinsurgency Manuals, and Podder (2013), examine the impact provision of services has on 
influencing civilian support. A RAND study of 89 insurgencies evaluated the strength of a 
correlation between fifty values and overall levels of state legitimacy. The study found that 
provision of welfare and basic services provided one of the strongest correlations to state 
legitimacy for all the indicators34. While this study examines state legitimacy, support from other 
studies by suggest that this concept can also be applied to insurgent actors who are able to 
provide “state-like” services.  The GSDRC report also suggests that civilian support of an 
insurgency increases if an insurgency provides services to populations the state is unable or 
unwilling to provide35.  
 Anderson and Black (2007) and Ethan Frisch (2011) provide just a few analyses that 
apply theory of organizational management to insurgencies to better understand insurgent 
capacity, function, and trajectories. I build on these arguments by applying literary evaluations of 
how law, provision of services, and management of propaganda campaigns contribute to 
insurgent legitimacy. Thomas Nachbar (2012) evaluates the relationship between insurgency, 
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legitimacy, and law arguing that how an insurgency implements and interacts with law portrays a 
strong representation of the insurgency’s legitimacy. In her book, Compliant Rebels, Hyeran Jo 
(2015) also examines why some rebel groups follow international law in conflicts, arguing that 
those that comply with international law do so to bolster international and national perceptions of 
the insurgency as a legitimate actor. The same studies that evaluated the impact of effective 
mobilization of goods, services, and programs on civilian support linked these processes to 
improvements in insurgent legitimacy36. Mobilization of goods, services, and programs can be a 
strong indicator of an insurgency’s ability to function. Processes that entail efficient mobilization 
of goods, services, and programs can provide strong evidence of insurgent success in economic 
control, political functioning, and procurement of resources37. The ability to manage these 
processes at a federal level indicates control over logistical networks, the national economy, and 
political structures38. Insurgent propaganda and media efforts are another attributing factor to 
insurgent legitimacy. Propaganda and media present avenues for recruitment, spreading of 
ideology, and presenting voice to supporters, the international community, and sceptics. 
Propaganda and media provides the opportunity to communicate widely with populations, 
without requiring access to official or traditional platforms of communication39. 
This analysis addresses several key gaps in existing literature on legitimacy in rebellion. 
First, literature fails to produce a comprehensive, well-rounded evaluation of factors that produce 
legitimacy in rebel groups. While the studies mentioned above address pieces of the rebel 
legitimacy puzzle, none address multiple factors in a given study, or place individual factors in 
the greater context of rebel legitimacy. This analysis evaluates multiple legitimating factors in a 
single context to determine their relationship to other legitimacy factors and allow for an 
evaluation of the impact of individual factors in the greater context of rebellion.  
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This analysis also addresses gaps in legitimacy literature concerning external actor 
involvement in conflicts.  External actors and external support are increasingly identified as 
significant influencers of rebel success40. DeRouen and Sobek (2004) completed a study to 
evaluate the determinants of success in rebel groups. Their analysis suggests that external 
support is the greatest determinant of conflict outcomes, with greater levels of support 
contributing to greater levels of success41. However, external actors have not yet been 
incorporated into discussions on legitimacy in rebellion. By evaluating legitimacy awarded by 
external actors, this analysis connects debates on external support to legitimacy literature. 
This analysis also contributes to contemporary legitimacy literature by applying legitimacy 
concepts to the rebellion in Chechnya. Russia consistently ranks lowest on the state legitimacy 
index and in legitimacy evaluations42. Local rejection of Russian legitimate rule and repeat 
rebellions suggest that legitimacy literature could introduce beneficial interpretations of conflict 
in Chechnya. This assessment introduces the application of legitimacy theory to the context of 
Chechnya, to highlight its relevance to regional context. 
Successful Rebellions 
The base definition of rebel success is the deposition of the state government structure and 
assumption of power by a rebel group or the achievement of de facto rule over a designated 
territory43. The contemporary reality of insurgencies and the growing presence of global and 
transnational factors complicate traditional definitions of insurgent success. In Syria, for 
example, multiple insurgencies with different objectives are occurring simultaneously44. The 
protracted nature of insurgencies can also mean that achievement of success in a given time 
period, does not equate to overall success of the insurgency or state. The Chechen insurgency’s 
achievement of de facto status in 1996 and loss of that status in 1999 is a great example of 
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temporary success. Likewise, gains in smaller-scale successes in insurgencies, such as 
sustainable support of populations, can indicate stronger levels of success than temporary de 
facto status or control of territory. For example, al-Shabab has not achieved control of official 
governing structures, but has achieved sustainable success in popular support by providing 
welfare services to populations the government lacks the capacity to provide45. 
Several studies address how and why insurgencies end. The RAND corporation finalized 
research on 87 insurgencies in the twentieth century to determine factors that contribute to 
ending insurgency. Insurgencies were grouped into three categories: 1) those that ended with 
insurgent success; 2) those that ended with state success; and 3) those that ended without sate or 
insurgent success. The study noted that each insurgency was influenced by local factors, but 
several noted patterns emerged. First, actors that won insurgencies tended to have substantially 
higher proportions of civilian support. Similarly, actors that lost insurgencies had lower 
proportions of civilian support.  Insurgencies that effectively captures political systems and 
mobilization of resources had substantially higher chances of success. States were more likely to 
achieve this, as states were more likely to have access to political and economic structures at the 
beginning of a conflict. The study also notes that the end of an insurgency does not require the 
full eradication of an insurgent organization or state46.  
Many government counterinsurgency manuals also include detailed descriptions of factors 
that indicate insurgent successes or failures. Factors include evidence of civilian support, 
economic control, political control, and negotiations with legitimate actors47. 
 Several academic studies also provide insight into the factors that influence success in 
rebellion. Fearon and Laitin (2004) present one of the more clear-cut descriptions of rebel 
success, crediting success to natural resources, presence of ethnic conflict, and distance between 
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conflict and the state capital. Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom (2001) argue that 
economic inequality, moderate ethnic division, and low per capita income produce longer 
conflicts, and support positive rebel outcomes. They also argue that conflict environments that 
heavily influence conflict outcomes are largely molded before conflict onset. Halvard Buhaug, 
Scott Gates, and Paivi Lujala (2009) build on earlier arguments to answer why some civil wars 
are more protracted and how rebels achieve successful outcomes. They list key geographic 
factors (distance from government administration centers, availability of safe havens, and rebels 
based on periphery) and civil capacity as the leading determinants of conflict duration and 
outcomes. Finally, Jacob Aronson, Paul Huth, Mark Lichbach, and Kiyoung Chang (2015) 
provide a detailed argument of how and why rebels win. Material capabilities and rebel access to 
resources is the strongest determinant of rebel success. Rebel success can also be influenced by 
state economic and military capacity, civilian information to support rebel military objectives, 
availability of shelter and safe havens, and access to external support. The study also found that 
highly favorable rebel outcomes are extremely rare and often occur without state concession. 
 While conflict literature has contributed to understanding how geographic, resource, and 
external actor presence influences rebel outcomes, legitimacy arguments have not yet been 
incorporated into outcome considerations. This analysis fills this gap by addressing how rebel 
legitimacy can produce avenues that can lead to these factors, thereby influencing rebel success. 
Methodology and Analysis: Developing a Framework for Assessing the Effects of 
Legitimacy on Success 
 
The variety of sources, concepts, and methodologies in contemporary literature provide 
insight into the challenge of defining and tracking the presence and effects of rebel legitimacy. 
This analysis provides a qualitative framework that guides legitimacy analysis in rebellion 
contexts. The framework addresses gaps in existing literature that fail to provide a 
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comprehensive examination of multiple legitimating factors, by identifying, organization, and 
defining existing factors of legitimacy into a single framework. The framework then builds on 
this evaluation of determinants of legitimacy to provide a structured methodology for assessing 
and tracking factors that lead to rebel success.  
The first step taken to develop this framework, was to identify and define factors of rebel 
legitimacy. The literature review contributed to substantially to determining the causes of 
legitimacy in conflicts. Legitimacy factors were incorporated into the framework if directly 
applicable to insurgency and rebel contexts, and if they were connected to avenues known to 
produce rebel success. For example, democratic elections in rebel groups can contribute to 
legitimacy amongst the international community, which can open channels to achieve resources, 
propaganda support, and diplomacy. The factors that held the strongest correlation to increasing 
insurgent legitimacy were: democratic elections; support of political institutions; support of 
political elites; access to formal negotiating processes; ideological connection to civilian 
populations and identity; protection of civilians; external connection to and support of rebel 
ideology; external material support; development of and adherence to internal and international 
law; effective ability to mobilize resources, programs, and services; and implementing effective 
propaganda and media campaigns.  
These factors are further organized into four categories of legitimacy: political space, 
external support, civilian support, and organizational management. The factors of each category 
produce legitimacy in similar areas, and contribute to similar avenues of success. For example, 
civilian protection and civilian ideological appeal developed stronger rates of legitimacy among 
civilian populations than external actors. Similarly, organizational factors produced stronger 
levels of legitimacy amongst foreign actors, which allowed rebels access to foreign diplomacy, 
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networks, and resources. This categorical organization allowed for a pointed analysis into 
different aspects of rebel group functioning. For example, legitimacy awarded through 
organizational management holds vastly different implications for obtaining resources, 
diplomacy, and the means by which a group can achieve success, then legitimacy achieved 
through civilian support. 
It is important to note the challenges of identifying, measuring, and defining legitimacy 
on a mass scale. This assessment attempts to evaluate the opinions and public standpoints of 
civilians, elites, institutions, foreign actors, and Islamist supporters, among others. The 
descriptions in this assessment are by no means a complete understanding of all attitudes 
amongst all groups that were active in the rebellion. Rather the assessment relies on public 
rhetoric, political activity, and the sources availability to deduce the perceptions of majority 
populations and public figures that can provide insight into these contributions. 
 It is also important to define success in the context of this framework. Conceptualizations 
of success were derived from academic literature, COIN manuals, and development reports. 
Non-academic assessments were incorporated into these definitions, as they provide a more 
detailed, measurable assessment of factors that indicate rebel success and failure. The framework 
evaluates rebel success as an intended outcome of rebel activity, and achievement of the intended 
goal to assume political rule over military, social, political, and economic activity in a given 
territory. Success is understood to be a process, in which achievements of territorial, social, 
economic, and military gains support the process of achieving full political control.  
 The framework builds on definitions of both legitimacy and success to assess a causal 
relationship between levels of legitimacy; access to resources, networks, and relations produced 
by heightened legitimacy; and successes achieved as a result of accessing these resources.  The 
 
16 
legitimacy factors point to areas in which rebel groups can take action to bolster their legitimacy, 
or fail to take action, thereby reducing their legitimacy. If the presence or removal of a 
legitimating factor is confirmed, rebel action taken as a result of heightened or reduced 
legitimacy will be tracked to determine the outcomes of heightened legitimacy on rebel access to 
resources, relationships, and networks. If a connection between legitimacy and resource avenues 
is identified, the outcomes of rebel access to these avenues will be traced to evaluate how these 
avenues contributed to rebel success.  
 The rebellion in Chechnya, active from 1990 to 2007, was identified as a case study for 
this framework for several reasons. Chechnya was chosen as a single case study due to to allow 
for an initial in-depth analytical application of the framework. The complexity of the rebellion in 
Chechnya makes it both a challenging and intriguing case for analysis. For the purposes of this 
paper, the “Chechen rebellion” refers to the separatist movement led by the de facto government 
and separatist insurgency, motivated by the objective of achieving an independent Chechen state. 
This specific rebellion was chosen for several reasons. First, the movement experienced high 
rates of success from 1991-1996 and a rapid deterioration in success following 1996. The rapid 
growth and reduction in success allows for a neutral analysis of the influence of legitimacy 
factors on rebel success in a context with relatively stable actor involvement, natural resources, 
geographic territory, and objectives. Additionally, this time frame allows for an evaluation of the 
natural initiation and end of the movement to establish the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. 1990 
signified the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the initial rebel control of 
government administration buildings, military bases, and territory. In 2007, Dokka Umarov, the 
fifth and final leader of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, declared the dissolution of the 
republic, and the establishment of its replacement, the Islamic Caucasian Emirate48. The 
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dissolution of the state and Islamist rhetoric accompanying the development of the Islamic 
Caucasian Emirate challenges the connection of the post-2007 insurgency to the initial 
movement. After 2007, the insurgency also adopted rhetoric, practice, and ideology that 
connected the movement to international jihadi movements. While it can be argued that this 
movement is, in fact, a continuation of the domestic separatist movement, the dissolution of the 
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and growing involvement with transnational jihadism present 
considerations that have yet to be address is academic literature, that are outside the scope of this 
paper. As such, the focus of this analysis ends in 200749. 
The actors involved in the Chechen separatist rebellion also must be defined. Although 
many groups were active in shaping the political, social, economic, and security environment in 
Chechnya from 1990-2007, the focus of this analysis is the Chechen separatist insurgency and 
the de facto government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. These two actors present an 
interesting case for examination for several reasons. First, these forces held crucial roles in 
shaping, maintaining, and leading the Chechen separatist rebellion. The leading role of these 
actors in shaping political, social, and military space in Chechnya in the 1990’s represented their 
ability to access legitimate Chechen political space in ways criminal organizations, warlords, and 
other active organizations failed to achieve. These two actors also facilitated the bulk of military 
and political activity directly targeting the Russian government and Chechen independence from 
1990 to 2007. Another key justification for examining the two actors is that de facto and 
insurgent leaders remain the only non-Russian affiliated Chechen political groups to facilitate 
negotiations and communications with foreign actors. Both the insurgency and de facto 
government have in some way influenced or been targeted by foreign media, assistance, 
research, and perception. These two entities were on the radar of the international community in 
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a way local criminals, warlords, radicals, and religious leaders were not. The de facto 
government remains the only non-Russian affiliated Chechen political entity to engage in 
economic, political, and social negotiations with foreign states and institutions.  
It is important to note that the de facto government and separatist insurgency were 
functioned as separate entities and experienced disagreement on some key areas until 1999. The 
insurgent invasion of Dagestan in 1999, is perhaps the greatest indicator of the complex, yet 
intertwined relationship between the de facto government and the insurgency. Chechen separatist 
insurgent forces invaded the Russian-controlled Republic of Dagestan to “liberate” the state from 
Russian control, despite heavy condemnation from de facto government leadership. When 
Russian troops entered Chechnya, however, the government switched messaging to support 
insurgent action, and militarily supported the insurgency’s fight against Russian troops. The 
leadership, resources, and military activity of the de facto government and separatist insurgency 
merged temporarily during the First Chechen War, and completely in 1999 as the de facto 
government lost control of political, geographical and economic territory and institutions.  
 This framework will be applied to the case study of the Chechen Rebellion in chapters 
three through seven. The framework will be used to guide an evaluation of the impact of rebel 
legitimacy in opening avenues for success in four key areas: political space, external support, 
civilian support, and organizational management. 
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CHAPTER 3: POLITICAL SPACE, LEGITIMACY, AND SUCCESS IN THE 
CHECHEN REBELLION 
 
In order to understand how legitimacy contributed to Chechen separatist gains and losses 
in domestic political space, it is important to understand the contextual realities of political space 
in Russia and Chechnya from 1990-2007. Political space in Chechnya in the early 1990’s can 
only be described as chaotic, unorganized, and influx50. The breakup of the Soviet Union, rise of 
Chechen nationalism, developing Wahhabism, and continued presence of warlords, criminals, 
and radicals presented significant challenges to securing Chechen political space in the early 
years of the rebellion51.  
Following his victory in the 1991 Soviet-Chechen elections, Dudayev harnessed the 
chaos of the breakup of the Soviet bloc and insecure Chechen environment to insert himself into 
the role of leader of the independence movement52. Legitimacy awarded to his rule through 
various means contributed to his ability to maintain control of Chechen political space, despite 
rampant criminal activity, a destitute economy, and administrative corruption. 
Putin’s rise to power and developing insecurity in Chechnya from 1999-2000 brought 
about a drastic shift in Russian-Chechen political space, attitudes, and policy53. One month 
before Russian presidential elections, Putin was faced with responding to the Moscow apartment 
bombing and the Chechen separatist insurgency’s invasion of Dagestan to liberate the Islamic 
majority republic from Russian rule. The pending elections and increasingly insecure 
environment in Chechnya influenced the president’s decision to implement harsh measures to 
crack down on Chechen rebellion54. The apartment bombings and invasion of Dagestan greatly 
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reduced the rebellion’s legitimacy. The bombings and repeat invasions of Dagestan represented a 
growing security concern to Russian and international actors55. The Chechen insurgency is 
credited with committing both the invasion of Dagestan and the apartment bombings. The de 
facto government publicly decried both the invasion of Dagestan and the apartment bombings, in 
an attempt to retain favorable perceptions amongst Russian actors and the international 
community56. External perceptions recognized the de facto government’s inability to control 
insurgent activity, or maintain security. This perception decreased perceptions amongst Russian 
administration, elites, and civilians of the Chechen government as a legitimate political actor, 
who could maintain control and rule over Chechnya57.  
Legitimacy catapulted the momentum of the independence movement in several key 
ways. First, the movement obtained early sympathies from international and domestic actors, as 
well as wide-spread support from the Chechen population58. Public acknowledgement in 
different arenas in Russian political space both restricted the Russian government’s ability to 
react harshly to the bid and opened avenues for rebellion leaders to access diplomacy, resources, 
and effectively declare control over Chechen political space59.  
Three factors, in particular, contributed to awarding the rebellion legitimacy in Russian-
Chechen political space: support of political institutions and elites, democratic elections, and 
negotiations. The three factors provide the strongest indicators of areas where insurgents 
managed to harness legitimacy to achieve greater access to the resources and relationships 
political space contributed to rebellion success.  
Support of Legitimate Political Institutions and Political Elites 
Political actors, namely elites and political leaders, awarded the Chechen separatist 
movement with varying levels of legitimacy from 1990 to 2007. These actors effectively 
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introduced and, eventually, reduced legitimate perceptions of Chechen independence into official 
Russian and Chechen political space. 
The initial submission of a bid for independence in 1991 sent shockwaves across the 
Soviet Union60. The administration failed to predict the republic’s bid application, and became 
faced with the possibility of either illegally rejecting the bid or losing the Chechen-Ingushetia 
Republic to independence. Fearing the effects an independent Chechnya would have on border 
security, national security, and the economy, the federal government ultimately decided to reject 
the bid61.  
Although Russia failed to accept the Chechen bid for independence, the state continued to 
provide financial assistance to Chechnya62. Absence of Russian administration and military 
presence in Chechnya from 1991-1998, led the Russia to rely on Dudayev and his administration 
to manage political and economic activity in Chechnya63. This dynamic awarded the de facto 
government with legitimacy, even without open acknowledgement of independence, as Russia 
was forced to recognize de facto leadership as the controlling power over Chechen politics, 
society, and the economic productivity. This acknowledgement forced Russia to maintain 
relations with the de facto government, which included a continuation of certain forms of 
financial and logistical support that were provided to Soviet-Chechnya64. 
Possibly the greatest representation of this relationship is Russia’s funneling of financial 
assistance through Dudayev’s administration to maintain Chechen oil refinery production from 
1991-1994. It is worth noting that during the early stages of Chechen independence, Russia 
anticipated a solution, in which Chechnya would remain under Russian control. As such, Russia 
feared losing the Chechen oil refineries and mining facilities it had invested in under the Soviet 
Union65. The welfare packages were intended to prevent the collapse of these industries so that 
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when Russia regained control of Chechnya it could continue to use the facilities without delay66. 
The political dynamic in Chechnya put Russian administration in a challenging position. Russia 
could reduce the legitimacy and capacity of the de facto government by reducing economic 
assistance, but would reduce their own economic gains from the refineries and would produce 
additional challenges when Russia regained control of the refineries. Ultimately, the government 
decided to acknowledge the de facto government as the practical point of contact for the oil 
refineries and negotiate continued maintenance of economic productivity through their regime67. 
In awarding assistance to the de facto government, Russia acknowledged the government’s 
ability to effectively manage fund to sustain oil productivity, as well as their control over the 
Chechen economy. This recognition solidified rebellion role in economic productivity in 
Chechnya.  
Russia’s provision of economic assistance to the Chechen de facto government had two 
effects on rebel legitimacy. First, Russia funneling economic assistance through the de facto 
government instead of Russian administration confirmed Russian acknowledgement of the de 
facto government as both an appropriate, and the only reasonable recipient of economic aid. This 
move also confirmed Chechen control of territory, economic activity, and facilities in the region. 
Second, this move also helped to secure the de facto government’s legitimacy as the coordinating 
power over Chechen oil refineries. Russia’s acknowledgement of the Chechen Republic as the 
actor through which economic and political relations should be funneled awarded the republic 
with control over economic negotiations with Russia and foreign states.  
The republic’s control of economic productivity supported the development of 
independent economic production, relations, and outputs68. The control and maintenance of oil 
production likely would not have been possible without Russian involvement in oil production 
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through economic assistance and providing oil to refine69. As such, Russian assistance played a 
crucial role in preventing collapse of the Chechen economy in the early 1990’s. Virtually all 
Chechen state funds were produced through these refineries70. The loss of economic productivity 
from the refineries would have been devastating to an already suffering economy. Further, the 
state would have virtually no legal or official economic outputs, as the bulk of all other activity 
was produced in the Chechen black market71.  
The attitudes of the Russian administration towards the de facto government shifted 
drastically after the First Chechen War72. Chechen victory left the Yeltsin administration 
humiliated, and further contributed to declining popular support. Further, while the 
administration before the war largely assumed that Russian military action would end the 
rebellion, the outcomes of control over Chechnya after the war became vague and 
unpredictable73. 
Following the war, Yeltsin supported the de facto government in early plans to rebuild oil 
pipelines that had been destroyed during the war. Russia intended to assume the bulk of financial 
responsibility for the project74. Russian support of the project signified Russia’s continued 
dependence and stance on Chechnya. 
 Vladimir Putin’s rise to power and developing insecurity in Chechnya from 1999-2000 
brought about a drastic shift in Russian-Chechen political space, attitudes, and policy. Putin 
portrayed a stark change in Russian leadership. An ex-KGB agent, pushing Russian nationalism 
and enforcing no-nonsense politics, Putin presented a stark change in Russian leadership 
compared to Yeltsin, the president that facilitated the demise of the Soviet Union, lost the First 
Chechen War, and was perceived as weak and undirected. Shortly after Yeltsin’s resignation and 
a month before official Russian elections, Putin was faced with responding to the Moscow 
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apartment bombing and the Chechen separatist insurgency’s invasion of Dagestan to liberate the 
Islamic majority republic from Russian rule75. Putin’s administration developed rhetoric around 
images of these events that painted the rebellion movement as Islamic terrorism, and a threat to 
Russian national security76. Putin’s administration introduced new conversations of Chechen 
independence into political space, whereby both the de facto government and the insurgency 
were terrorists, and posed threats to Russian national security.  
Putin revoked many of the legitimating aspects of Yeltsin’s policies, including foreign 
assistance to the government. In 1999, Russia ceased all provision of aid to the de facto 
government, signifying a shift in legitimate perception of Chechen leadership in Russian 
leadership and administration77. The removal of aid left the republic financially independent, and 
struggling to obtain oil to produce through refineries, and the financial capacity to maintain 
refinery production. The reduction of legitimacy severed the rebellion from Russian political 
space, financial assistance, and material support. The reduction of Russian resources had 
immediate impacts in reducing Chechen economic productivity, and diplomatic power78.  
Russia’s rhetorical mixing of the de facto government and the insurgency further 
contributed to delegitimating perceptions of an independent Chechnya in domestic political 
space, as civilian and political perceptions of the government were increasingly linked to 
incidences of terrorism and Islamism. 
Following the war, Russia continued its battle against the Chechen economy by 
announcing that the destroyed oil refineries would be rebuilt in Kabardino-Balkaria, outside of 
Chechen borders and control79. Russia did not initiate moves to re-develop Chechen 
infrastructure and economic productivity until 2005, when Chechen government administration 
and territory were firmly under the control of Ramzan Kadyrov. Putin’s removal of de facto 
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leadership from political space and control of Russian priorities also signified a shift in Russian 
perceptions of Chechnya as a legitimate political actor, to perceptions of the de facto government 
as an illegitimate actor. 
Russian elites present another interesting evaluation of legitimacy in Chechnya. By most 
accounts, the initial independence bid received ample support from Russian academics and a 
large portion of Russian politicians80. Russian academics that favored Chechen independence 
produced a substantial body of public writing and thought to justify independence. This writing 
was largely organized around two areas of thought. The first, was the legal and ideological 
authority of the Chechen peoples to establish a nation-state. There second, was a consideration of 
the benefits of removing Chechnya, an ethnically diverse, predominantly Muslim population, 
from a developing, ethnically Russian state.81  
Support from Russian academics and select political elites contributed to awarding 
legitimacy and fast forwarding the momentum of the movement in two key ways. First, the 
ample body of writing produced by Russian elites in public, official political space allowed for a 
conceptualization of the legitimacy of the Chechen separatist movement in official Russian 
political space82. The placement of such ideology allowed for substantive discussions on 
Chechen independence to take place in official political arenas. Second, the power of elite 
writers, and use of legal and nationalist rhetoric to justify the movement all contributed to 
influencing positive perceptions of Chechen separatism as a legitimate and justified act amongst 
state, elite, and civilian actors in both Russia and Chechnya. Polls in the early 1990’s suggest 
that Russian civilians were largely sympathetic to Chechen independence83. 
Both these factors opened avenues for Chechen independence to enter Russian political 
space as a realistic avenue for advancement. The involvement of Russian elites also contributed 
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to influencing how the Russian administration could and did react to the bid for independence84. 
Elite legitimation of the movement’s justification made brute military force less appealing. 
Yeltsin feared isolating academic and elite support of Yeltsin’s administration, which was 
already suffering from declining popular support85. Political legitimation of the independence 
movement contributed to Russia’s willingness to hold more traditional political negotiations with 
Chechnya, resulting in their ability to negotiate and establish political and economic power in 
Chechnya.  
Support for the Chechen movement amongst Russian administration and political elites 
decreased rapidly after the initiation of the First Chechen War86. Russian academics became 
disillusioned from the idea of a peaceful transition to independence after the First Chechen War. 
By 1999, Russian academics had completely pulled support of Chechen independence. Rhetoric 
and framing of the Chechen independence movement in Russian literature shifted substantially 
during this period presenting the movement as one of terrorism instead of a legitimate quest to 
develop a nation-state. In November 1999, the Russian Academy of Academics of Socialism and 
the Union of Internationalists delivered a conference condemning the Chechen independence 
movement as terrorism87.  
The deterioration of Russian elite support contributed to reducing the legitimacy of the 
rebellion movement in the same way awarding support contributed to legitimacy. Lack of 
support reduced the rebellion’s legitimacy in official Russian political space and rhetoric. In the 
same way positive perceptions of the rebellion fostered positive opinions of the rebellion 
amongst Russian civilians, elites, and politicians, negative portrayals of the rebellion movement 
produced negative perceptions of the movement amongst these same groups. 
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Reduction in Russian elite academic and political support had several important effects 
on the rebellion’s access to political space and accompanying benefits. First, rising negative 
perceptions of the rebellion in political space reduced the ideological flexibility in official 
political space of awarding Chechen independence. In particular, growing associations with 
Islamic extremism and acts of terrorism influenced decisions made by actors in political space to 
begin to treat the rebellion as an insurgency versus a legitimate political regime. Lack of support 
from Russian elites allowed Russia to pursue a harder stance against Chechnya without fear of 
political repercussions from elites88. This enabled Putin to implement policies revoking rebel 
legitimacy, and reducing economic and political negotiations with rebel actors, with the backing 
of Russian elite writing and influence. As a result, rebel legitimacy was substantially reduced in 
official Russian political space. 
Chechen political elites also played crucial roles in affecting the rebellion’s legitimacy. 
Initially, Chechen political elites supported the movement, as they believed it would increase 
their power in Chechnya. Chechen elites were particularly attracted to the opportunity to benefit 
from access to and control over an independent Chechen oil industry89. Dudayev’s leadership 
and the initial momentum of the movement seemed to confirm the potential for success of an 
independent Chechnya. For these reasons, elites awarded Dudayev with legitimacy in Chechen 
political space, by supporting his leadership, cause, and activity90. The support of Chechen 
political elites allowed Dudayev to access the resources, power, and networks of elites, and 
reduced Russian presence in these networks. As a result, Dudayev was able to access previously 
established political, social, and economic networks supported by Chechen political elites, many 
of whom had been active in Soviet-Chechnya91.  
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Support of Chechen elites declined drastically by the start of the Second Chechen War. 
Maskhadov’s inability to gain control over a rapidly deteriorating economy, political system, and 
security environment challenged assumptions that an independent Chechen state would produce 
greater avenues to economic, political, and social power in Chechnya92. Perhaps the strongest 
indicator of a shift in the Chechen political elites is the actions of Akhmad Kadyrov, the 
Republic of Ichkeria’s then-Chief Mufti. Kadyrov, initially a staunch supporter of Chechen 
independence, became disillusioned with the insurgency, growing Wahhabi influence, and the 
protracted conflict with Russia93. He negotiated a deal with the Russian government, leading 
insurgent troops to a devastating ambush in 2000, that contributed significantly to Russian 
victory over insurgent forces. In return, Kadyrov was inserted as interim President of Chechnya, 
and received state backing during the 2003 elections, that put him in power. Back in power, 
Kadyrov reinstated the power of Chechen political elites who retained a pro-Russian stance and 
retained connections from Soviet Chechnya94. Many of those inserted into power were belonged 
to Kadyrov’s Sufi administration under the rebellion95.  
The removal of Chechen elite support effectively reduced the rebellion’s access to 
political space in Russia and Chechnya. Under Kadyrov, Chechen elites returned to activity 
mimicked under the Soviet system, such as attending Orthodox Christian services with Russian 
politicians96. Rebel leaders were isolated form this system and its resources, and Russia was 
reintroduced into political space, by supporting Chechen elites97. It has been argued that Ramzan 
Kadyrov, elected as President of Russian-mandated Chechnya in February 2007, is under control 
of Russia due to Russian financial payments and certain types of support that directly benefit 
Kadyrov and Chechen political elites98. 
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The initial recognition of the Chechen independence movement as a legitimate movement 
amongst domestic political elites and administration significantly contributed to bolstering the 
legitimacy of the insurgency itself. Decreases in this support reduced the rebellion’s access to 
official political space, and correspond to a direct reduction in rebellion control of political 
resources, administration, and economic productivity. Shifts in support of these actors indicated 
a shift in power, whereby the insurgency lost its support of the most powerful people in Russia 
and Chechnya. The rebellion’s dislocation from political space, institutions, and elites also 
represent a dislocation of political power in Chechnya. 
Democratic Elections 
In 1990, Dudayev, a newly retired Red Army General, returned to Chechnya to pursue a 
career in local politics99. Soon after returning, he was voted president of the Executive 
Committee of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People. This unofficial political party 
served as the main form of political opposition to the Soviet party in Chechnya, and was based 
on a platform of Chechen sovereignty. In this position, Dudayev led two significant riots against 
Russian administration buildings in Grozny and a Soviet military base outside Grozny. The riots 
effectively removed Russian officials and military from both posts100. 
Dzhokhar Dudayev, was officially elected as President of Chechnya in October 1991. Upon 
election, Dudayev had popular support winning the election by a 60% majority vote101. 
Monitored by representatives from the UN, OSCE, and over 20 foreign countries, the election 
was, arguably, the most democratic in Soviet and post-Soviet Chechen history102. When 
Dudayev declared Chechnya an independent state months later, the democratic nature of his 
election lingered.  Both the representation of Chechen voice and the undeniable support of 
Dudayev and the movement for independence bolstered perceptions of Dudayev as a legitimate 
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ruler over the Chechen Republic, making representative decisions for Chechen civilians in the 
eyes of the international community, Chechen civilians, and Russian civilians. The early show of 
democracy by the Chechen government posed a stark contrast to historical Russian 
administrative management of politics in Chechnya103. Russian undemocratic tendencies were 
highlighted following Dudayev’s declaration of independence, when Russia sent troops to 
Chechnya in an attempt to militarily remove Dudayev from power and insert a Russian-backed 
leader104.  
The leaders of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria maintained an awareness of the 
legitimating benefits awarded by democratic elections in the early years of the movement. Upon 
Dudayev’s assassination in 1996, his vice president, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, assumed power in 
accordance to the Chechen constitution105. The following year, elections were held and Aslan 
Maskhadov was voted into the Presidency with a 65% popular vote, over Shamil Basasev, the 
leader of the insurgency106.  
Dudayev’s democratic leadership heightened the legitimacy of the rebellion movement. 
Popular vote of Dudayev, and apparent support amongst civilians for the independence 
movement confirmed that the government was acting in adherence to the desires, needs, and 
realities of the Chechen population107. Democratic leadership determination also set the tone for 
anticipated political practice and representation in Chechen political space. Democratic 
leadership both confirmed and increased support of Chechen civilians whose voices were largely 
ignored in Soviet Chechnya108. It also bolstered support from Western states and international 
institutions that perceived Dudayev and his administration as a potential democratic ally in 
Eurasia109. 
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The assassination of Maskhadov in 2005 marked a shift in the rebellion’s democratic 
determination of leadership. By 2002, Russia had fully regained control of government buildings 
and had reestablished a Russian-controlled administration and military presence110.  In 2002, 
Putin hand-picked Ahkmad Kadyrov to be inserted into Chechen leadership. Kadyrov’s 
Presidency was confirmed in 2003, although the democratic nature of elections was contested111.  
Russia’s recapturing of control of official Chechen political space, challenged the 
legitimacy and capacity of rebel leadership. As the rebellion lost access to formal political 
institutions, rebel activity was forced to operate increasingly underground. Formal elections, 
leadership, and management of administration facilitated by Kadyrov presented ideological and 
capacity threats to rebel leaders. In 2005, the rebellion lacked access to the means through which 
formal elections could be facilitated. As such, the leadership positions of Sadulayev, and later 
Dokku Umarov, were determined by a small council of rebel leaders112. 
The declining inclusion of Chechen populations in determination of rebel leadership 
represents a growing distance between the population and the rebel movement.  As the 
movement is forced to move underground, becoming less accessible to Chechen civilians. The 
insurgent’s lack of representation of populations, due to lack of access to political space and the 
populations themselves, contributes to decreased the legitimacy of  insurgent leadership. Without 
elections, there is no confirmation that insurgent leaders represent popular opinion, belief, or 
choice113. There is also no communication or connection between insurgent leaders and civilians 
that would indicate democratic leadership. This dislocation decreases the legitimacy of insurgent 
leadership to successfully enact, determine, and fulfil the needs of Chechen citizens. 
Potential for Negotiations 
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 Access to negotiations between Chechen rebels and the Russians state is another factor 
that influenced rebel legitimacy. Negotiations between the Chechen insurgency and the Russian 
state were common in the early years of the insurgency. From 1991-1998, Chechnya and Russia 
maintained regular communication and actively facilitated negotiations, and honored negotiated 
arrangements114. 
 The earliest negotiations between the Russian state and Chechen de facto government 
were initiated in 1991 and targeted Russian-Chechen control of Chechen oil refineries115. The 
bulk of Russian oil production in the North and South Caucasus was refined and distributed 
through facilities outside of Grozny. The oil refineries also served as the base of independent 
Chechen economic productivity116. As a new state facing severe economic challenges and high 
rates of unemployment, Chechnya recognized the need to maintain control of oil refinery 
production. It also recognized the need to secure buyers for oil production. Negotiations with 
Russia facilitated both needs117. A determination was made that Russia would pay Chechnya to 
use the oil refineries, allowing Chechnya to reap the economic benefits of oil production, while 
Russia continued to profit off of selling oil externally and using the oil internally118.  
Russia’s willingness to negotiate with the de facto government to reap the economic 
benefits held substantial implications for state perceptions of the rebel movement’s legitimacy. 
Instead of ceasing economic activity with the de facto government, Yeltsin’s administration 
maintained open communication, and negotiations with the de facto government regarding 
Chechen oil industry119. In allowing Chechnya the power of negotiation, Russia relinquished 
some of its own legitimacy and power over the Chechen economy.  
Several outputs were produced through this relationship that contributed to rebel success. 
First, Russian negotiations helped rebels secure control over Chechnya’s economic productivity, 
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relationships, and processes120. The de facto government harnessed this power to initiate 
economic relationships with foreign states, including Georgia, the U.S., and European states121. 
The government was also able to keep economic outputs of oil productivity that could be used to 
implement state services and programs122.  
Russian and rebel groups also held active negotiations during the First Chechen War.  
Chechen rebels effectively negotiated several cease-fire agreements with the Russian State123. 
Two key negotiations were the Khasavyurt Accord and the treaty “on peace and principles of 
Russian-Chechen relations” signed at the end of the First Chechen War. On August 30, 1996 the 
Khasavyurt Accord was signed by Maskhadov (acting as chief of staff), and Russian General 
Alexander Lebed124. This agreement formally ended the First Chechen War and negotiated the 
withdrawal of all federal military troops and government entities from Chechnya.  The treaty was 
followed by the treaty “on peace and the principles of Russian-Chechen relations” signed in 1997 
by Yeltsin and Maskhadov (acting as president).  This treaty effectively provided a framework 
for Russian-Chechen relations and formally recognized de facto status of the Chechen Republic 
of Ichkeria125. This treaty, and its acknowledgement of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria’s de 
facto status forced Russia to accept the insurgency as the legitimate, if temporary, power in 
Chechnya.  
Achievement of de facto status marked the highest levels of legitimacy for the Chechen 
rebellion126. De facto status legitimated, legalized, and secured the republic’s control of Chechen 
economic activity, civilians, and governance. Negotiations also awarded the Chechen rebellion 
with the power to voice its concerns, needs, and demands directly to the state. The negotiation 
process entailed Russia acknowledging rebellion needs, and addressing them where 
appropriate127. 
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The 1997 Treaty marked the final negotiation between Russia and the Chechen 
insurgency. In 1999 Putin implemented a policy of non-negotiation with Chechen separatists, 
mimicking international trends of non-negotiation with terrorists128. This policy effectively 
severed avenues for communication and negotiation between the Russian state and rebel leaders. 
This policy also signaled an end to Russia’s treatment of the de facto government as a legitimate 
power that warranted a diplomatic and economic relationship with Russia129. 
Putin’s non-negotiation policy was increasingly effective during the Second Chechen 
War. Maskhadov reached out to Putin several times to negotiate cease-fire agreements or peace 
settlements during the Second Chechen War and was repeatedly rejected130. Russia’s failure to 
acknowledge negotiations was met by increasingly brutal, guerilla-type warfare enacted by the 
rebellion131.. The Russian rejection of two requests for cease-fires in 1999 were immediately 
followed by large-scale terrorist attacks. Rebel leadership stated that these attacks were a 
response to lack of Russian acknowledgement of cease-fire discussions132. Near the end of the 
war Maskhadov attempted to negotiate a settlement of succession, entering a peace agreement in 
which Chechnya would no longer operate as an independent state, but this too was rejected by 
Russia133. The Second Chechen war, itself, ended without a formal peace agreement or 
negotiation.  Putin declared the war over in 2000, but has retained an active troop presence and 
counterterrorism operations through to 2007134. Despite Russia’s declaration of victory, 
incidences of terrorism, insecurity, and violence continued to rise135. 
The non-negotiation policy was followed by a rapid rise in terrorism at the hands of the 
rebellion. The end of negotiations removed the rebellion from legitimate means of 
communication with the state, which reduced their ability to express needs, to advocate for 
Chechen needs and separatist movement, and to have their needs acknowledged and addressed 
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by Russia136. Yagil Henkin (2009) notes the shift in rhetoric of the notorious Chechen insurgent 
leader, Shamil Basayev, in the hostage crisis in 1996, in which he promises not to kill civilians, 
and in hostage situations in 2004 and 2005, in which Basayev openly celebrates the killing of 
civilians137. Increasing reliance on terrorist tactics to communicate and negotiate with Russia and 
civilian populations contributed significantly to decreasing the insurgency’s legitimacy.  
Russia’s non-negotiation policy dislocated Chechen insurgents from legitimate avenues 
of communication and diplomacy with the Russian government. This policy indicated an end to 
the Russian government’s treatment of the rebellion as a legitimate political force, and as such, 
reduced the rebellion’s ability to have its needs heard, justified, and addressed through traditional 
political corridors.  The removal of negotiations from Russian-rebel relations contributed to rebel 
territorial losses during the war, loss of economic independence from the destruction of oil 
refineries, and inability of rebel leaders to represent, voice, and secure the needs of ethnic 
Chechens in domestic political space138.  
The non-negotiation policy also led rebel groups to pursue non-traditional means of 
communicating with and overpowering the Russian state. Following Putin’s retraction of 
negotiations, rebels increasingly performed acts of terrorism, hostage taking, and intimidation to 
gain power139. Growing use of these methods, further developed state, civilian, and external 
perceptions of the rebellion as an Islamist extremist movement, versus a separatist movement. 
External perceptions of the rebellion as a terrorist organization further alienated rebel ability to 
access negotiations with state and external actors. Virginia Page Fortna (2015) conducted a study 
that found that rebel groups that utilize terrorism as a tactic produce longer conflicts, but 
ultimately achieve fewer successes as terrorism alienates groups from external support and 
resources. 
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CHAPTER 4: EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
External support is another influencer of rebel legitimacy.  External support for rebellions 
can be provided by international institutions, foreign states, foreign non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) foreign extremist organizations, migrants, and foreign religious 
institutions140. These actors can perceive rebel groups as legitimate if the actions or ideologies of 
the group align with external actor objectives, ideology, and goals141. External actors can provide 
a range of ideological and material support to support rebel activity. External actor perceptions 
of legitimacy are formed around their own ideologies, objectives, and needs142. For example, one 
of the leading reasons the U.S. supported the early Chechen bid for independence, was due to the 
belief that Chechen-controlled refineries would produce cheaper, more easily controlled oil 
products, than Russian-controlled refineries. 
Two factors influence external actors to provide legitimacy and support to rebel groups.  
The first, is support of a rebel group’s ideological basis143. External actors often support rebel 
ideology if the ideology aligns with the actor’s own set of principles and ethnics, or if the rebel 
group’s ideology is beneficial to the goals of an external actor. Another legitimating factor is the 
provision of resources, recruitment, and access to logistical networks144. Studies by Bynum 
(2010) and Fearon (2000) have linked external support to rebel sustainability, as material support 
provided by external actors bolsters rebel capacity145. While external actors can provide support 
to organizations perceived as illegitimate, support is more likely to be sustainable and have 
greater investment if the receiving group is perceived as legitimate. 
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Legitimacy awarded through external actors can create several key avenues that translate 
into success. First, external actors provide legitimacy through ideological support, applied 
through propaganda or media campaigns, or advocacy. Ideological support can be applied 
domestically, in an actor’s own political space to shape foreign and domestic opinions of rebel 
movements in their own political space. Ideological support can also be applied in the 
international arena to influence the action or opinion of foreign actors146. This propaganda 
shaping can provide an ideological basis the state can harness to justify foreign assistance, 
international advocacy, and military or humanitarian intervention147. External actor support can 
also contribute to a rebel group’s ability to access international political space, the transnational 
economic relations, and relations with foreign states and businesses148. These avenues develop 
rebel legitimacy by allowing rebel groups access to “legitimate” challenges of resource 
procurement, economic activity, diplomacy and communication, and receiving support. Access 
to these avenues bolsters insurgent capacity by increasing the resources and connections 
available to rebel groups149. Access to “legitimate” resources also bolsters perceptions amongst 
legitimate actors that rebel groups have the potential to become legitimate political actors150. 
It is important to note that two forms of external support are available to rebel groups. 
“Legitimate” external actors act within legal means of international and domestic law, have 
access to traditional means of diplomatic communication, and actions are dictated by 
international rules, norms, treaties, and environments. “Illegitimate” external actors, include 
extremist organizations, radicals, criminals, and warlords. These external actors operate largely 
outside of the law, maintain financing and resources through illegal activity and criminal 
networks, and black markets. Assistance from “legitimate” and “illegitimate” actors have vastly 
implications on legitimacy. For example, al-Qaeda assistance to Chechen rebels reduced 
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perceptions of legitimacy amongst the international community, but increased the rebels’ 
legitimacy amongst Islamist organizations151. Perceptions of legitimacy as an “illegitimate” actor 
awarded the Chechen rebellion access to resources, international propaganda platforms, and 
heightened international attention to Chechnya. Both avenues provide different types of 
resources, benefits, and connections152. 
In Chechnya, ideological support and propaganda campaigns, as well as provision of 
materials, recruitment, and access to logistics networks have strongly contributed to bolstering 
rebel legitimacy. The strongest external support factors that contribute to legitimacy are support 
of insurgent ideology and propaganda, and providing access to materials, recruitment, and 
logistics networks. 
Ideology and Propaganda 
In the early stages of the bid for Chechen independence, Chechnya received cautious 
support from the U.S., U.K., and UN153. Chechen independence occurred at a challenging time 
for the international community, that was balancing newfound concepts of international 
humanitarianism; foreign assistance to conflicts in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia; and re-
establishing relationships with a post-Cold War Russia154. The Chechen bid for independence 
proposed an inherent conflict of interest to these values155. International actors also balanced 
these considerations with the potential benefits of a Chechen state. Many believed an 
independent Chechnya would provide freer access to its oil production. Many also hoped that 
Chechnya would provide a reliable, democratic ally to the West in Eastern Europe156. 
Dudayev’s early independence movement appealed to newfound international liberal 
values in several ways. First, the democratic nature of Dudayev’s elections, support of Chechen 
citizens and presented the possibility for the successful development of a democracy in 
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Eurasia157. The de facto government’s rhetoric and constitution presented components of 
democracy, adherence to international law, and attention paid to humanitarian needs of the 
population158. An independent, democratic Chechen state would produce a Western ally on 
Russia’s border that could support the influencing and spread of democracy in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia159. 
An independent Chechen state also presented the potential for foreign powers to secure 
economic and diplomatic ties in Eurasia. In particular, Chechen economic independence from 
Russia and control of its oil refineries also presented the possibility for Western powers to reduce 
dependence on Russia for oil, and held the potential for foreign powers to invest in the budding 
industry to their benefit160.  
Despite the definitive impossibility of military or humanitarian intervention in Chechnya, 
the international community intervened in the early movement through ideology and propaganda. 
Bill Clinton is credited with harnessing his relationship with Yeltsin to influence Russia’s 
diplomatic treatment of the de facto Chechen government towards a softer, non-military 
approach in Chechnya161. UN and EU Agencies attempted to gain access to Chechnya during the 
wars to monitor human rights abuses and needs. Human rights abuses committed by Russia and 
Chechen separatists were decried in official UN channels162. 
Following the First Chechen War, growing security concerns, particularly rising Islamic 
extremism, produced a decline in international community support for Chechen independence163. 
The Chechen government’s ineffectual ability to manage the growing rise of terrorism, militias, 
criminals, and corruption decreased international perceptions of the government’s potential to 
operate as an independent state164. These perceptions were fueled by Maskhadov’s cabinet, 
which included rebel leaders, such as Shamil Basayev, who was responsible for the hostage 
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crises in 1995 and 1996, and an attempted impeachment of Maskhadov in 1992165. Maskhadov’s 
inability to gain control of economic and political activity in Chechnya, further reduced 
international support by alienating expectations of benefiting from an independent Chechen oil 
economy166. A succession of high-profile attacks launched by Chechen insurgents in the late 
1990’s formally secured the reduction in international support of the Chechen government. In 
1998, Chechen insurgents initiated a hostage crisis that resulted in the deaths of four British 
engineers at the hands of Chechen extremists167. That following year, Chechen insurgents 
committed the Moscow apartment bombing, and invasion of Dagestan. The government’s 
inability to secure economic productivity or security led the majority of foreign investors, 
humanitarian organizations, and diplomats to cease investment, implementation, and economic 
activity in Chechnya168. 
International opinions of the Second Chechen War were mixed. In 1999, Russia severely 
reduced foreign state and institutional access to Chechnya, reducing the international 
community’s involvement in monitoring war crimes and providing humanitarian assistance169. 
International support further declined after the September 11th. Following the attacks, Russia 
framed the Chechen rebellion as part of the greater global trend towards Islamic extremism. 
Putin attempted to develop relations with the U.S. based on a shared sense of victimization from 
Islamic extremism170. The ideological War on Terror, further alienated the insurgency’s 
legitimacy in the international community due growing fears counterinsurgency activities 
targeting Islam, terrorism, and the transnational al-Qaeda network, which Chechen insurgents 
were known to be connected with171. Increasingly brutal attacks launched in retaliation against 
Russian military brutality during the Second Chechen War seemed to confirm the title172. From 
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2002 to 2004 Chechen insurgents launched seven deadly terrorist attacks, further securing their 
terrorism title and further alienating international sympathy173.  
The ideological shift in the international community from one of humanitarianism, global 
peace and supporting development of national identities shifted to one of fear, survival, and 
alienation of perceived Islamic threats174. These perceptions contributed to reducing the 
legitimacy of the movement, that became looped in with the harsh, often dehumanizing 
perception of Islamic extremism. These perceptions greatly impacted the rebellion’s access to 
international political space, diplomatic channels, and resources. Stricter laws in the U.S. and EU 
against terrorist organizations, reduced avenues through which assistance could be provided in 
Chechnya175. The rebellion’s failure to distance itself from growing international perceptions of 
Islamic terrorism substantially reduced their legitimacy in the eyes of the international 
community. By 2002, Chechen separatists were recognized by the UN, U.S., and several other 
states across Europe as a designated terrorist organization176. The formal recognition of terrorism 
severed the rebel group from opportunities of negotiation, diplomacy, and foreign assistance 
through international institutions and many foreign states. As a result, rebel actors found 
themselves cut off from the ability to develop economic relations, obtain resources and materials, 
and voice ideological and humanitarian needs in formal diplomatic platforms177. 
Foreign Islamic actors have also played a significant role in influencing the Chechen 
rebellion’s ideological path. Moshe Grammer (2008) found that the lack of Islamic schools in 
Chechnya, due to resource restrains and anti-Islamic policies from the Russian Federation, led 
many Muslim Chechens to seek Islamic schooling abroad. These schools exposed the younger 
Chechen population to Wahhabi theories of Islam, that were easily incorporated into the case of 
Chechnya, where war against a perceived foreign oppressor had been waged for decades178.  
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Wahhabism played a substantial role in directing the insurgency’s ideology in the later 
years of the movement. It also contributed significantly to the rebel’s ability to garner support 
from al-Qaeda179. Chechen rebels became acquainted with the founding members of al-Qaeda as 
foreign fighters in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980’s. Within the conflict, Chechen 
and Afghan rebels had important similarities. The social structures of both groups were 
organized around a complicated mixture of Islamic, communal and tribal practice. Both groups 
were engaged in a fight with the Soviet Union to remove a foreign colonial-type power from 
their traditional land. These ideological similarities allowed Afghan rebels, later organized into 
al-Qaeda, to sympathize and internalize the Chechen independence movement180. 
When Dudayev declared independence in 1991, the established al-Qaeda movement sent 
one of their prominent leaders, Abu Abdullah, to Chechnya to establish training camps, teach 
Wahhabism, and support the separatist cause181.  Abdullah is credited with helping plan key 
insurgent activity during the First and Second Chechen wars, including the invasion of Dagestan 
and encouraging the rise in jihadi tactics after 2000182. He also served as a mentor to insurgent 
leader Shamil Basayev, who led key military operations in the Chechen Wars, and played an 
active role in the insurgency until his death183. Abdullah acted as the main point of contact 
between al-Qaeda and the insurgency. He opened Wahhabi schools in Chechnya, reducing the 
need for young Chechens to travel abroad to attend religious schools. He also provided military 
training, and al-Qaeda-based ideology184. 
Al-Qaeda affiliates also supported the Chechen rebellion’s propaganda efforts. Many of 
the movement’s successful social media campaigns are mirrored after al-Qaeda and ISIS 
propaganda campaigns and rhetoric. Since 1998, al-Qaeda supported the Chechen cause on 
extremist social media platforms, portraying positive reinforcement for Chechen independence, 
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and supporting the removal of Russia from the North Caucasus185. Al-Qaeda support in 
developing independent Chechen separatist propaganda media and harnessing their own 
platforms to sell the Chechen separatist cause provided the rebellion with international 
recognition and legitimacy amongst international Islamist groups. Training and propaganda 
development support helped the rebellion establish its own propaganda campaign. Al-Qaeda 
support was particularly effective in supporting the establishment of Chechen separatist social 
media presence, which allowed rebels to communicate with a wider, international audience. Al-
Qaeda also promoted Chechen insurgents and their cause on international al-Qaeda platforms, 
which contributed to the cause gaining legitimacy amongst Islamist organizations globally186.  
Chechen diasporas were also key external supporters of the rebellion. In particular, the 
early Chechen insurgency benefited heavily from propaganda efforts by Jordanian-Chechen 
communities living in the Middle East187. Jordanian-Chechens abroad helped mobilize sympathy 
for the Chechen cause in states across the Middle East188. This mobilization led sympathetic 
Middle Eastern states to adopt pro-Chechen platforms in international diplomatic arenas189. 
Several states, including Jordan, Syria, and Iraq also accepted Chechen refugees following the 
Chechen wars190. The Chechen cause was easily mobilized in many states still recovering from 
legacies of Western colonialism.  
Middle Eastern sympathies for the Chechen cause began to decline in 2003 following the 
succession of rebel terrorist attacks in Russia191. Many states in the Middle East fighting al-
Qaeda units began to identify more with Russia and a shared fight against terrorism than with an 
increasingly extremist Chechen insurgency192. The reduction in the rebel cause’s legitimacy 
created a shift in diplomatic rhetoric, and domestic propaganda from pro-Chechen separatism, to 
anti-Chechen terrorism. This ideological shift contributed to fewer champions actively 
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supporting Chechen independence in international diplomatic arenas. Jordan and Syria also 
implemented changes in immigration policy, reducing Chechen diaspora and refugee access to 
visas193.  
Provision of Resources, Financing, and Access to Logistical Networks 
External provision of resources, financing and access to logistical networks presents 
another important indicator of rebel legitimacy. Upon declaring independence, the de facto 
Chechen state benefited from many of the resources Russia left behind194. The use and 
destruction of rebel resources and destruction of Chechen oil pipelines forced rebels to seek 
alternative methods of procuring resources from 1996-2007195. A devastating war, followed by a 
deteriorating security environment meant that businesses were producing little productivity, and 
had little security in the safety of infrastructure and employees196. By 2002, Russia had regained 
control of Chechen government buildings, oil refineries, and military bases. Rebel losses in these 
areas resulted in the movement being completely cut off from the legitimate Chechen 
economy197. 
Initially, the de facto government attempted to distance itself from Islamic extremism in 
Chechnya198. The Chechen separatist insurgency, alternatively, welcomed training, arms, and 
resources from Islamist supporters, particularly al-Qaeda affiliates199. After the First Chechen 
War, a desperate need for supplies, soldiers, and allies increasingly influenced the de facto 
government’s dependence on Islamist supporters, warlords, and criminal networks to obtain 
resources200. While the numbers of foreign fighters are contested, an active presence of foreign 
Islamic fighters has been confirmed in both Chechen wars201. Following the Second Chechen 
War, the complete retraction of assistance and support from the international community, led the 
movement to rely almost exclusively on al-Qaeda to obtain funding, arms, and other materials202. 
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The increasing interdependence between the Chechen insurgency and al-Qaeda affiliates 
contributed to the Chechen black market becoming a trafficking hub for Afghan trafficking and 
poppy trade203. 
Greater legitimacy amongst al-Qaeda affiliates opened avenues for rebel actors to profit 
from al-Qaeda criminal and poppy networks, increased affiliation with these networks further 
alienated international perceptions of the rebellion a legitimate political entity204. As the 
government, insurgency, and crime became increasingly intertwined, differentiation between 
legitimate political actors and criminals became blurred. Efforts to provide foreign diplomacy 
and assistance to Chechnya became increasingly challenging, as the politicians and leaders in 
Chechen political space were increasingly associated with criminal networks and activity205. By 
the start of the Second Chechen War, Russia had become a more appealing ally, through which 
foreign assistance and diplomacy could be channeled206. Increasing reliance on Russian over the 
de facto government to manage economic and political matters in Chechnya, signaled a reduction 
in external perceptions of rebel legitimacy. Ultimately, this shift contributed to a distancing of 
external material support and diplomacy with the de facto government, in favor of Russia.  
Delegitimization of the rebellion was further confirmed by earmarking of foreign 
assistance for terrorism from 2003-2007. During this time, Russia welcomed a stream of foreign 
assistance for Chechnya207. The bulk of this assistance was earmarked as part of a greater “hearts 
and minds” campaign to help Russia combat its growing “Chechen terrorist problem”208. The 
targeted nature of this assistance had several key effects on shifting legitimacy in the Chechen 
insurgency. First, the provision and negotiation of funds with the Russian Federation clearly 
identified the international community’s recognition of Russia as the legitimate ruler of 
Chechnya. Second, the targeting of the assistance as part of a “hearts and minds campaign” 
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signaled the international community’s recognition of the insurgency as a terrorist organization, 
and thereby an illegitimate actor in Chechen political space. In providing assistance to combat 
terrorism, the international community also invested in the eradication of the Chechen 
insurgency. This framing of foreign assistance had stark consequences on delegitimizing the 
Chechen insurgency. While originally supported as a legitimate separatist movement in the early 
1990’s, by 2000, the rebellion’s legitimacy was severely reduced by growing perceptions of 
terrorism. The shift in perception contributed to swaying international actors to rely more on 
Russia to manage economic, political, and social matters in Chechnya. As such, the rebellion was 
effectively removed from external channels that had previously awarded it with the ability to 
negotiation, voice its needs and objectives, and receive financial and material support.  
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CHAPTER 5: CIVILIAN SUPPORT 
Civilian support constitutes another important factor that determines rebel legitimacy and 
success. The acknowledgement of civilians of their perceived ruler has significant implications 
for the legitimacy of the ruling body. Civilians award legitimacy through adhering to law, 
voluntary military service, accepting rebel management of economic activity, not resisting rebel 
political activity, and actively participating in public elections209. In performing these actions, 
civilians support the functioning of the ruling system210. Effective political systems represent and 
act in the best interests of civilians, and will receive support from civilians to ensure the active 
maintenance of the system’s functioning211. Traditionally, states manage political functions, 
protect civilians, maintain security, and provide key services. However, if civilians perceive a 
non-state actor as a more legitimate actor in these roles, civilians may award more support and 
legitimacy to the non-state actor to sustain their support of the population212.  
The factors that most strongly affect civilian support of rebel groups are connection to 
rebel ideology and perceptions of rebel groups as civilian protectors. Civilian support opens 
avenues for rebels to recruit volunteers and obtain resources, information, and shelter213. Access 
to these resources can translate into rebel military victories, control over populations, economic 
control, and sustainable access to local resources, all of which produce successful outcomes in 
rebellion214.  
Two main factors bolster rebel legitimacy among civilians. The first is the ability of the 
rebel movement to appeal to civilian ideology, identity, and tradition. The second is civilian 
perception of the rebel group as a protecting agent. 
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Legitimacy through Ideology, Identity and Tradition 
The Chechen identity is constructed from a complex interplay of religious, social, 
cultural, and political factors215. Some argue that Russian rule has never been fully accepted by 
the Chechen population as legitimate216. In part, this is due to a stronger connection to communal 
ties, religious institutions, and tribal governance than a national identity among the Chechen 
population217. The conceptualization of an independent Chechen state arises out of a sense of 
perceived legitimacy of Chechen populations to rule over their own peoples and territory.  
The early rebellion was largely mobilized around Chechen nationalism and the right of 
Chechen populations to declare an independent nation-state218. Dudayev himself presented fitting 
leadership for such a campaign, as his life portrayed a stereotypical image of the Chechen 
identity and reality. An ethnic Chechen, he returned to Chechnya in 1959 with his family, who 
had been deported to Kazakhstan in 1944 under Stalin’s orders. After attending university in 
Moscow, Dudayev launched a successful career with the Russian Red Army, retiring a war hero. 
Upon returning to Chechnya, Dudayev entered local politics as an advocate for Chechen 
independence, pushing a campaign formulated from a mix of social, religious and ethnic 
symbolism219. Dudayev’s appeal to Chechen identity and lifestyle contributed to the population’s 
ability to connect with his ideology and vision for the rebellion. 
The legacy of Stalin’s deportation of ethnic Chechens in 1944 also awarded an 
ideological driver for the rebel movement. Grammer (2009) believed that the deportation and a 
lingering sense of victimization served as a stronger unifier of ethnic Chechens than a shared 
ethnic or religious identity. Recent memories of Chechen victimization spoke more strongly to a 
diverse Chechen population than historical constructs of nomadic lifestyles that had little impact 
on contemporary realities of the population220. 
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 In 1991-1992, Chechnya experienced a mass emigration of ethnic Russians and non-
Chechen minority populations out of the Republic221. The mass emigration solidified the unity of 
a Chechen population, and the de facto government’s ideological right to rule the population. In 
just two years, the Russian population dropped from 36% of the Chechen population to 1.5%.222 
By 2002, 93.7% of the population in Chechnya was ethnic Chechen, compared to 65.4% in 
1991223. 
The ideological connection between civilians and the rebel movement vastly contributed 
to widespread civilian support of the rebellion. A number of indicators suggest that public 
support for Chechen independence and Dudayev’s rule was relatively high and wide spread224. In 
Chechnya, rebel declaration of independence and establishment of the Chechen Republic of 
Ichkeria was met with a peaceful transition. Civilians did not riot, protest, or reject the 
determination225. Additionally, thousands of civilians volunteered to join the Chechen military 
upon the declaration of independence and more were present when Russian troops entered 
Chechnya to remove Dudayev from power in 1991226. 
Achieving legitimacy amongst Chechen populations contributed to several key insurgent 
successes. First, popular support made it easy for the government to recruit and mobilize 
volunteers for an army, that proved crucial in maintaining the government’s control of Chechen 
military bases, administrative buildings, and oil refineries227. Chechen support of independence 
from Russia helped increase legitimacy in external perceptions of the rebellion cause. Higher 
levels of legitimacy contributed to external support of the rebellion. Chechen civilians also 
provided information to the insurgency from 1991 through to 2002228. Several rebel ambushes 
and military victories during the two Chechen Wars were achieved through information provided 
by civilians229. Civilians also provided safe havens to rebel leaders and militia during and after 
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the wars230. These safe havens became particularly important and dangerous after 2000, when the 
rebellion lost access to political space and was forced to operate in hiding from Russian security 
forces. Chechens for an independent state contributed to external support of the movement’s 
legitimacy.  
 The movement experienced a stark ideological shift after 1996, which challenged 
perceptions of its legitimacy amongst civilians. Growing Wahhabi influence in insurgent 
rhetoric, tactics, and motivations alienated large portions of Chechen populations who identified 
with less conservative, Sufi forms of Islam and were largely secular in practice231. Life under an 
Islamic state had vastly different implications for Chechen populations than the secular, modern 
state headed by Dudayev. In particular, many Chechens found it difficult to identify with a state 
that increasingly called for the inclusion of sharia law in the constitution, seclusion of women, 
and participating in translation jihadi wars232. These ideals did not mesh with the realities of a 
population that identified more strongly with Europe than the Middle East, had some of the 
strongest gender equality in the Russian Federation, and rarely attended religious services233. 
 While the full effects of civilian support from 2000 to 2007 are difficult to assess due to 
lack of data, state control of media, and implementation of harsh punishment against rebel 
supporters and families that could deter expression of anti-Russian opinion. Support for Russian 
rule is assumedly low, indicated by low voter turnout in public elections, political brutality 
against civilians, and media reports of rampant human rights abuses and corruption234. Russia’s 
maintenance of military presence in Chechnya, and growing numbers and scale of terrorist 
attacks from 2000 to 2007 indicate the rebellion continues to receive enough recruitment, 
resources, and support to sustain activity235. What portion of recruitment and resources comes 
from the population versus external actors, such as al-Qaeda, is more difficult to determine. The 
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rebel’s media website, Kavkaz.org, posts weekly reports of civilian murders, disappearances, and 
violence at the hands of Russian security forces236. Such accounts may indicate justification for 
rebellion recruitment. 
Protection of Civilians 
 The ability, perception, and implementation of civilian protection enacted by rebel groups 
presents another factor that contributes to rebel legitimacy amongst civilian populations. The 
early rebellion organized much of its rhetoric around the grievances and victimization of 
Chechens who were deported on Stalin’s orders237. The deportation order was one of a number of 
anti-Islamic, anti-Chechen policies implemented by the Soviet Union from 1920-1954, the 
effects of which remained in the living memories of Chechen populations238. The bid for 
independence was justified as much by a conceptualization of national identity as by the appeal 
of protection from future Russian policies. The pending breakup of the Soviet bloc in 1991 and 
transformation of Russia into an ethnically Russian state further exacerbated Chechen concerns 
over their freedoms, safety, and role in an ethnically Russian state239. The potential for 
independence brought with it a hope for security of Chechen identity and livelihoods.  
Dudayev’s history as a successful Red Army general and early military successes against 
Russian troops in Chechnya bolstered perceptions of the rebellion’s ability to protect civilian 
populations. This perception was further justified when Chechen rebels and civilian volunteers 
successfully deterred Russian troops from removing Dudayev from power in 1991. When 
Russian troops entered Chechnya in 1994 initiating the First Chechen War, Dudayev declared his 
government would protect civilian populations for Russian aggression240. 
The perception of rebels as protectors was shattered during the First Chechen War. The 
government was able to negotiate cease-fire deals, and made large efforts to reduce civilian 
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casualties. However, by the end of the war, civilian casualties were estimated to be between 
50,000 and 100,000241. Additionally, while Dudayev and Maskhadov attempted to adhere to the 
rules of war, two large scale hostage crises were produced by rebel leaders. In both crises, 
civilians were used by the rebels as shields against oncoming Russian militia242. The high 
number of casualties, despite cease-fire negotiations and peace agreements, contributed to a 
sense of failure and reduced legitimacy of the de facto government’s ability to protect Chechen 
civilians. 
Maskhadov’s failure to establish economic, social, or political control after the First 
Chechen War, further contributed to a sense of failure and protection of the government. The war 
destroyed houses and businesses, produced casualties, and left hundreds of thousands of civilians 
in need of services and assistance243. Civilians and soldiers who lost houses, suffered injuries, 
and faced other challenges of war anticipated assistance the government did not have the 
capacity to provide244. The de facto government proved largely ineffective in providing basic 
support to soldiers, injured civilians, internally displaced persons, and returning refugees245. 
Inability to provide services that could protect and service needy civilians reduced civilian 
perceptions of the rebellion as a legitimate protector and political force. 
 The Second Chechen War presented even greater challenges to rebel ability to protect 
civilians. The increasingly brutal policies of the Russian military under Putin’s command, lack of 
cease-fires, and virtual absence of media influenced rebel leaders to pursue harsher, guerilla 
warfare type tactics246. The Second Chechen War produced a rise in rebel-initiated terrorism, of 
which civilians were often casualties247. Rebel disregard for civilian casualties reduced the 
effectiveness of rebel claims that they were fighting to support and protect civilian lives. Greater 
movement towards guerilla warfare also brought war increasingly out of battlegrounds and into 
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cities. One such battle occurred in 1999 when Shamil Basaev was leading a battle against 
Russian troops. After suffering terrible losses, Basayev led the remaining rebel militia, followed 
by Russian troops, to his hometown, anticipating that familiarity with the terrain would provide a 
military advantage. Instead, Russian militia destroyed the town and killed nearly 100 villagers, 
including six members of Basayev’s family. Civilian opinions of the rebellion were further 
reduced after incidences such as these, where the rebellion was perceived as putting civilians at 
risk248.  
The Second Chechen War also presented crushing military blows against the rebellion on 
a scale not seen in the First Chechen War249. The failure of the insurgency to negotiate with the 
Russian government to secure peace deals challenged civilian perceptions of rebel ability to 
protect Chechen civilians against Russian forces. One of the main reasons for Kadyrov’s 
defection from the insurgency is the perception that conceding to Russia as the surest way, 
possibly only way, to end the war and achieve security in Chechnya250. 
 While Russia declared victory over the rebellion in 2000, forces failed to achieve control 
of Chechnya until 2002251. From 2002 up until 2007, Russia retained an active military presence 
of security forces in Chechnya and launched an ongoing counterinsurgency campaign to address 
the Chechen insurgency252. Russia’s COIN operations further challenged the legitimacy of rebel 
protection of civilians. After 2000, Russian troops were ordered to punish rebels and suspected 
supporters. Family members of rebels became targets for imprisonment, torture, and murder253. 
Over time, security forces largely failed to differentiate between Chechen civilians and Chechen 
insurgents, resulting in arbitrary arrests, torture, and civilian disappearances254. While the 
rebellion references such acts commonly in propaganda campaigns, rebels failed to openly 
challenge or deter Russian action. Rebel absence in civilian wrongs at the hands of the Russian 
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government effectively reduces any claims made by rebels after 2002, that their objectives 
included protecting civilians.  
 In fact, after 2002 rebel tactics increasingly shifted to acts of terrorism and jihad, over 
guerilla warfare and open altercations with Russia255. While these acts largely targeted Russian 
police, government, and military, civilian casualties were often produced in such attacks256. From 
2000 to 2005, high-profile terrorist attacks committed by Chechen rebels produced roughly 777 
civilian casualties from seven attacks, mostly by suicide bombs257. Comparatively, from 1994-
1999 Chechen rebels committed only three high-profile terrorist attacks, implemented as hostage 
taking, that produced about 459 civilian casualties258. Rebellion rhetoric shifted from protecting 
civilians, to eliminating foreign influence and establishing a jihadi state. Rebel leaders began to 
utilize violence and intimidation in limited areas of control to make civilians adhere to sharia law 
and rebel objectives259. The determinant shift away from civilian protection in rhetoric, action, 
and objection drastically contributed to reductions in rebel legitimacy amongst civilians after 
2002. Recent media interviews with civilians indicate the presence of anti-extremist attitudes in 
local populations260. 
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CHAPTER 6: REBEL LEGITIMACY THROUGH ORGANIZATIONAL 
CAPACITY 
 
 Rebel groups function like organizations in many ways. They depend upon adequate 
procurement and management of resources, finances, and human capital. They are run by 
individuals that develop different thought processes, motivations, and loyalties261. They are often 
driven by an ideological goal implemented through a hierarchical structure262.  They are also 
driven by a code of conduct that dictates the actions and decisions of involved actors263.   
The effectiveness or ineffectiveness of an insurgency’s organizational management can 
greatly contribute to its legitimacy in the eyes of civilians and external actors264. Rebel groups 
that effectively manage legal systems, service delivery networks, and financial resources produce 
higher external perceptions of the group’s ability to function successfully as a legitimate political 
actor. Greater levels of legitimacy in areas of organizational management contribute to trust 
amongst external actors that the rebel group can responsibly receive and manage certain 
financial, diplomatic, and political responsibilities265. This trust opens avenues for external actors 
to support rebel groups in ways that can contribute to success, such as provision of materials and 
financing. 
Three factors that most drastically influence rebel legitimacy in the area of organizational 
management are implementation and use of law; ability to mobilize goods, services, and 
programs; and propaganda and media campaigns. 
Implementation and Use of Law 
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Rebel creation, adherence to, and management of law have strong effects on external 
perceptions of legitimacy266. Rebel implementation of democratic principles, protection of 
civilians, and stable political practices in law bolster rebel legitimacy in the eyes of the 
international community267. Implementation of sharia law, authoritarian rule, or failure to 
introduce legal measures that protect civilians can reduce perceptions of legitimate amongst 
“legitimate” actors. However, laws can also appeal to “illegitimate” external actors by 
conforming to their ideals and beliefs. For example, al-Qaeda encouraged the implementation of 
sharia law into Chechen legal structures, which boosted the rebel group’s legitimacy amongst 
Islamist organizations268. Legal determinations can solidify Islamist perceptions of the rebellion 
as an Islamist organization, encouraging support from Islamist institutions. Similarly, the 
development of laws that allow civilian voice, ensure civilian freedom and protection, and 
incorporate civilian needs contributes to higher levels of civilian legitimacy, and open avenues to 
civilian support269. For example, pro-Chechen laws in the early Chechen constitution contributed 
to civilian support of the rebellion in its early years. The development of laws to protect 
civilians, and the de facto government’s maintenance of the law confirmed the de facto 
government’s support, and presented a shift from Soviet law, that failed to secure the rights and 
safety of Chechen populations and Islamic practices. 
Adherence to law also affects rebel legitimacy. Creation of law is just a piece of 
establishing an effective legal system. Whether a rebel group follows and implements their laws 
contributes to evaluations of their ability to act as a legitimate political actor270. Rebel action 
taken in accordance to law may be perceived as more justifiable than action taken outside of law. 
For example, groups that have established codes for punishment are more likely to be viewed as 
legitimate in enacting punishment against an actor, if punishment and the crime are in line with 
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established rule of law. Punishment enacted outside of the decree, process, and methods outlined 
in law is perceived as less legitimate, and may be more likely to be attributed to civilian violence 
or terrorism271. 
Less than a year after declaring independence, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria released 
its constitution272. The Republic’s leaders ruled by the constitution. In public and rhetoric, it was 
essential for Dudayev, and later Maskhadov, to be viewed as a legitimate state by the populations 
of Chechnya, Russia, and the international community273. Enforcing this perception was largely 
implemented through developing and following democratic procedures and rule of law274. The 
constitution established the republic as a democracy, based in the legal determination of the 
Chechen people. The constitution allows for a healthy checks and balances system between 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Insurgent leadership also committed to ensuring the 
law was represented by the will of Chechen populations. Legislature wording emphasizes the 
protection and rights of Chechen civilians, but fails to address rights for non-Chechen 
civilians275. While the constitution initially separated church and state, the de facto 
administration amended the constitution in 1994 to incorporate sharia law in response to growing 
demands from Islamic leaders276. 
The de facto government also ensured close adherence to international law, humanitarian 
law, and law of war during the First Chechen War277. The insurgency was particularly careful to 
follow international law during negotiations with Russian troops, taking prisoners, and 
interacting with civilians278. The rebellion did this in an active attempt to boost its legitimacy in 
the eyes of the international community. Grammer (2008) presents a compelling narrative, in 
which Chechen rebel leaders believed Maskhadov to be “mad” due to his insistence on waging 
traditional, legal warfare, despite the losses it cost the movement. He publicly decried the two 
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hostage crises led by Basyaev, and declared rebel troops who used civilians as hostages would be 
punished as criminals under the Chechen constitution279. Active adherence to both international 
and rebel law produced a sense of reliability and honesty between rebel groups, and civilians and 
external actors. By obeying laws, the rebel group proved their commitment to protecting 
civilians, thereby garnering civilian legitimacy, and to upholding laws and policies, thereby 
improving international legitimacy.  
 The start of the Second Chechen war led to a decrease in adherence to international law 
by both sides280. Increasingly brutal policies, and lack of negotiation from Russian military 
forces were met with retaliating brutality and violence from the insurgency281. Attempts to 
adhere to international law, such as one-sided cease-fire concessions, led to devastating rebel 
losses on several occasions282. The rebellion’s disregard for international law and growing 
application of terrorism and guerilla tactics in warfare made it easier for both Russia and the 
international community to categorize insurgent acts as terrorism, reducing the rebellion’s 
legitimacy. 
By 2000, the rebellion had lost all legal authority and implementation over Chechnya’s 
populations, government, and territory. Rebel actors were stripped of legal authority in the 
Russian state283. In 2000, Russia implemented a series of laws that stripped suspected terrorists 
of many basic rights. Under these laws, individuals could lose right to legal trail, freedom of 
speech, and even citizenship284. Suspected terrorists and supporters often received no trial, facing 
imprisonment or death based on suspect alone. Harsh legal action could be taken even against 
advocates of Chechen human rights or autonomy, under the pretense that such action supports 
terrorism285. 
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After losing the power of law, accounts of insurgent activity among populations and 
growing acts of terrorism indicate that rebels increasingly relied on intimidation and terrorism to 
negotiate with Russian and civilian populations286. Laws implemented by the rebellion after 2000 
were heavily embedded in sharia law and included policies such as the seclusion of women, 
stoning and beheading as punishment, and trial by Islamic council. Many of these laws contained 
elements that do not adhere to international law or democratic practices287. Implementation of 
sharia law also contributed to delegitimizing the insurgency among populations that did not want 
or follow sharia law. Such laws reduced civilian and international perceptions of legitimacy of 
the insurgency. Civilians failed to perceive the laws as legitimate interpretations or 
representations of their identities and livelihoods, and the laws often failed to protect secular and 
female populations288. Similarly, such laws reinforced perceptions of terrorism in the eyes of the 
international community, and a movement away from commitment to democratic practices and 
liberal ideals. 
Mobilization of Goods, Services, and Programs 
Mobilization of goods, services, and programs is another key indicator of rebel 
legitimacy. A rebel group’s ability to mobilize goods, services, and programs supports its claims 
that it can and should function as a successful political entity289. Effective mobilization of goods, 
services and programs significantly impact perceptions of legitimacy amongst a number of 
actors. First, ability to mobilize these services supports rebel claims that it is able to function as a 
government, and can serve the best interests of populations. Second, rebel management of 
governance confirms the ability to adequately function in political space, through participating in 
and facilitating political, economic, and social activity. 
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The ability to mobilize goods, services, and programs presented one of the Chechen 
rebels greatest weaknesses. By the end of the First Chechen War, and rise of Maskhadov to 
power, the failure of the de facto government to control basic services significantly reduced their 
legitimacy amongst domestic and external actors290. The removal of Russian military forces and 
administration from Chechnya in 1991, awarded the rebellion with a wealth of resources 
procured from Soviet facilities and infrastructure. The de facto government built a military from 
volunteers and captured military bases. The Chechen administration filled Soviet-Chechen 
administrative buildings in Grozny. The Chechen economy remained dependent on Soviet built 
oil refineries that continued production outside of Grozny291.  
In many ways, Dudayev and the Republic of Ichkeria inherited an uncontrollable system. 
Soviet rule left Chechen systems weak, corrupt, and unkempt292. However, in gaining positioning 
to control these systems, Dudayev securely inserted the rebellion into official Chechen political 
space. With access to political space came a responsibility to control governance in Chechnya, 
especially in the absence of Russian administration and governance293. The Chechen population 
initially believed the existence of an independent Chechen state would improve civilian life, 
political representation, and economic productivity294. The hope for a better life encouraged 
many to support the cause through voting, military service, and resource contributions. These 
beliefs contributed to legitimacy of Dudayev and his administration’s early initiatives to control 
Chechen resources and governance, despite severe challenges and ineffectual governments in 
early years. Similarly, the de facto government’s assuming ability to mobilize goods encouraged 
legitimacy amongst foreign states that the government could effectively maintain political and 
economic control and management. Such activity fostered perceptions of the de facto 
government as a viable alternative to Russia in managing oil production out of Chechnya, and 
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potentially, for supporting the spread of democratic liberal values in Eurasia295. External actors 
intended to harness the opportunity for greater economic control in Chechnya, by initiating 
economic and political negotiations with the de facto government and putting pressure on Russia 
to support independence296. Economic considerations also put Chechnya on the international 
radar, which contributed to international media coverage and UN involvement297. 
The administration’s failure to gain control of economic or political governance over time 
contributed to a decline in the group’s legitimacy amongst both civilians and the international 
community298. By the end of the First Chechen War, many of the resources and arms pilfered 
from fleeing Soviet forces had been captured, destroyed or used. Russian bombing and military 
campaigns destroyed large portions of the infrastructure in Grozny, including an estimated 50% 
of residential housing, and 90% of economic infrastructure299. Maskhadov had recently assumed 
leadership, following Dudayev’s death, and faced the difficult realities of transitioning from the 
position of insurgent leader to president. His administration proved ineffective in gaining control 
of the economy, establishing rule of law, or personnel to establish effective government 
programs. The cabinet failed to provide basic government services, procure and mobilize 
resources, or establish control over devastated political infrastructure, deteriorating security 
environment, and declining economic productivity300. The government’s inability to successfully 
govern Chechnya led many to question whether the de facto government was capable of running 
a state and reduced perceptions of its legitimacy in Chechen political space301. Such perceptions 
discouraged international investment and assistance to a perceivably weak and ineffective 
government302.  
The Second Chechen War further incapacitated the government’s ability to mobilize 
basic services and programs. The war further depleted resources, and caused additional strains to 
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economic and infrastructure damage. By the end, civilian and soldier casualties nearly doubled, 
as did displacement, and destruction of property. The Russian military had effectively destroyed 
what was left of Grozny’s infrastructure and Chechen oil refineries, incapacitating independent 
economic productivity in Chechnya303. 
Fearon (2000) argues that insurgency’s main goal is survival, that military action is the 
staunchest way to secure this goal, and that when in survival mode this goal will come before all 
else, including protection of civilians and provision of services. From 2000 to 2007, the Chechen 
insurgency appears very much to be in survival mode. The insurgency not only failed to provide 
services to Chechen populations, but appears to have ceased trying to provide them. The bulk of 
the insurgency’s resources after 2000 consisted of weapons procurement, mainly through 
extremist networks304, further delegitimating perceptions of the insurgency to actively create and 
manage a political system. The lack of rebel focus and ability to provide basic services to civilian 
populations and establish control of governance further reduced rebel legitimacy amongst 
civilians. The group’s failure to support civilian protection, livelihoods, and interests discouraged 
civilian support to the rebellion. 
By 2002, Russian forces had re-gained control of military bases and government 
administration buildings in Chechnya305. Control of these buildings reinstated Russian control of 
Chechen political space. Without formal structures, the insurgency found itself removed from the 
means through which to provide programs, services, or goods to the Chechen population306. 
Russia’s insertion of Kadyrov to power further reduced the power and control of the rebellion in 
official political space. Kadyrov allowed Russia to funnel financial, economic, and infrastructure 
support to Chechnya, while maintaining control of political affairs307. The insertion of Kadyrov 
challenged de facto legitimacy, as he presented an alternate option for domestic and external 
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forces to control Chechnya. Kadyrov, under Russian control, harnessed governance in Chechnya, 
and the obtained the official role of mobilizing resources, programs and services308. Chechen 
citizens no longer looked to rebel leaders for control, governance, or services, as they were no 
longer able to provide them.  
The insertion of Kadyrov into leader of President in Chechnya also presented challenges 
to international perceptions of the rebel legitimacy. Kadyrov’s provided an official, legitimate 
point of contact in Chechnya, through which assistance, diplomacy, and resources could be 
organized. By 2002, the rebellion had lost its platform, leverage, and capacity to receive and 
mobilize such resources in Chechnya309. As a result, it also lost its access to legitimate means of 
foreign assistance, resources, and networks to provide political and material support to civilians. 
Control of Propaganda, Media and Messaging 
 In 1991, the declaration of Chechen independence was in local, national, and 
international news outlets. Initial reports of independence had highly legitimating effects on the 
movement. Reports on Chechen independence made international news, putting Chechnya and 
its movement on the international radar310. Stories painted by Russian academics and foreign 
journalists were largely pro-Chechen independence, effectively influencing opinions abroad311. 
The largely pro-Chechen representations awarded a sense of legitimacy to the Chechen cause, 
where the Chechen people were seen as victims of Soviet oppression who deserved to be freed. 
The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria’s messaging mainly targeted the Chechen population 
and Russia312. Propaganda for an independent Chechen state was highly effective in mobilizing 
Chechen popular support for independence, combining an effective mix of ethnic nationalism, 
secular Islam, and lingering sentiments of victimization from the Soviet state. This form of 
messaging was successful in connecting with injustices felt among the populations and the hope 
 
64 
for a solution313. The messaging contributed to developing legitimacy amongst Chechen 
civilians, which resulted in the ease of mobilizing civilians to support the early years of the 
movement. 
 The Russian invasion and start of the First Chechen War presented a shift in media 
images surrounding Chechen independence. Russian and foreign media outlets were highly 
active in the First Chechen War314. The initial invasion challenged international perceptions of 
the Soviet bloc breakup as a movement towards a non-aggressive Russia and international 
security. TV in particular, presented powerful images of war, death, and destruction in 
Chechnya315. Public opinion was exposed to both Chechen and Russian grievances during war, 
which had both legitimating and delegitimating effects on the insurgency. Why the insurgency 
attempted to uphold international law and avoid civilian casualties, death presented by its 
independence was still presented on TVs across the world. In particular, live reporting of the 
1996 hostage crisis provided horrific images of Chechen civilians being mowed down by 
Russian artillery after being used as human shields by insurgent forces316. These perceptions 
challenged rebel claims that the rebellion was a legitimate political institution organized around 
protecting Chechen civilians. 
 The Moscow apartment bombings were regarding with dismay, and reported by media 
outlets harshly317. Images from these bombings and clashes during the Chechen invasion of 
Dagestan largely justified the Russian military intervention in Chechnya. Media presence was 
largely restricted during the Second Chechen War, allowing Russia to control the messaging, 
images, and information coming out of Chechnya. The messaging further reduced the legitimacy 
of the insurgency as legitimate political actor and bolstered the legitimacy of Russia as the 
legitimate political force and enforcer of security. 
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After declaring the war over in 2000, Russia effectively shut down all Chechen and external 
media presence in Chechnya. Journalists, internet access, and Chechen media sources were 
heavily restricted. Those who continued to report, faced harsh punishments. Ann Politkovskaya 
was a Russian journalist renowned for her stories of Russian state corruption and violence, 
particularly in the North Caucasus. In October 2006, Politkovskaya was found murdered in the 
stairwell of her apartment building, in retaliation for anti-Russian reports318. 
At the same time, Russia launched an anti-Chechen propaganda campaign, that targeted 
national and international perceptions of the Chechen insurgency. The campaign was highly 
effective in the Chechen insurgency as a movement for Islamic terrorism, instead of the quest for 
an independent nation-state319. The propaganda campaign, fueled in large part by media images 
from the Second Chechen War, followed by the 9/11 attacks was highly effective in eradicating 
perceptions of the insurgency as a legitimate independence movement. The campaign was also 
supplemented by an increase in terrorist attacks by the hands of Chechen separatists that were 
widely reported on by international journalists320. Stories of terrorism presented virtually the 
only news reports on Chechnya, further contributing to international perceptions of Chechens as 
terrorists and delegitimating the insurgency. 
The insurgency had begun to mobilize its own campaign, harnessing social media and 
internet sources to provide information and propaganda outside of Chechnya. After Putin 
declared victory in the Second Chechen War, Chechen insurgents launched the website 
Kavkaz.org., anticipating Russian censorship321. To this day, Russia has failed to shut down the 
site, allowing the Chechen insurgency a continued outlet for propaganda, recruitment, and 
messaging to Chechnya and beyond322.  The site has been designated as a terrorist website and 
shut down in several countries, including the U.S. However, since 2000 the website has been 
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used widely by journalists, advocates, and policy analysts to decipher events in Chechnya as it 
presents virtually the only non-Russian media source for events inside Chechnya323. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION: SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND 
ANALYSIS 
 
The Chechen separatist rebellion paints a compelling picture of the significance of 
legitimacy on rebellion outcomes. In Chechnya, rebel successes appear to increase significantly 
in response to avenues opened by actors that view the group as a legitimate entity. From 1991-
1998, the rebellion achieved de facto rule of Chechnya, fostering support from Chechen civilians 
and institutions, Russian non-governmental actors, and many within the international 
community. In 2000, shifting domestic and international perceptions driven by growing Islamist 
rhetoric, weak organizational capacity, and reduced civilian support contributed to declining 
perceptions of the rebel group as a legitimate political force. The reduction in legitimacy 
manifested itself in reduction of external support, which contributed to significant rebel losses in 
economic, political, social, and territorial control. 
This evaluation found that rebel achievements of legitimacy produced higher levels of 
support expressed through resources, diplomacy, propaganda at the hands of those perceiving the 
group and its cause as a legitimate political force. As such, higher levels of legitimacy could be 
tracked to higher levels of success. 
This finding also produced several more detailed evaluations of the effects of legitimacy 
on rebel success. First, it can be understood that the greater number of actors that provide 
legitimacy to the rebel group, the more avenues to access resources, diplomacy and networks a 
rebel group achieves. In the case of Chechnya, both the insurgency and de facto government 
succeeded in establishing perceptions of the de facto government and the Chechen independence 
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movement as a legitimate political movement amongst non-governmental Russian populations, 
the international community, and Chechen civilians. Legitimacy influenced each actor’s support 
of the cause via the resources and means available to them. 
Similarly, decreased legitimacy in “official” political arenas, increasingly encouraged 
Chechen rebels to pursue legitimacy in non-official avenues, particularly through associations 
and support from Islamist jihadi groups. Legitimacy acknowledged in non-official avenues 
awards access to different channels of diplomacy, resources, and networks. Similarly, 
perceptions of legitimacy in non-official venues may vary from perceptions in official arenas. 
For example, while Western states base concepts of legitimate legal practices on liberal 
democratic values, Islamist organizations may perceive legitimate law as sharia law.   
Not all factors of legitimacy need to be present to allow rebel groups to increase access to 
resources through legitimacy means. For example, from 1991-1994, during its highest period of 
legitimacy and success the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria failed to effectively control or mobilize 
government services, programs, and resources.  
This analysis also indicates that insurgent success and legitimacy, do not correlate to 
insurgent sustainability. The modern Chechen insurgency experienced high levels of success in 
the early 1990’s, but ultimately lacked the means to sustain their activities. 
Another important finding is that certain factors of legitimacy correlate more strongly to 
certain areas of success.  For example, legitimacy awarded through external actors, correlated 
strongly with achievements of material success and access to international diplomatic and 
economic space. These same factors proved to have little effect on civilian perception and 
support. In Chechnya, external actors tended to focus their perceptions of rebel legitimacy in 
areas that benefitted their objectives. For example, organizational management appeals strongly 
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to foreign states that seek to support rebel groups to develop economic or political relationships. 
Similarly, civilian perceptions were influenced most strongly by domestic considerations that 
directly affected civilian livelihoods. 
More research is needed to evaluate the effects of rebel legitimacy on success in contexts 
outside of Chechnya. However, findings from the Chechen case produce findings that warrant a 
wider evaluation of legitimacy contributions to rebellion outcomes. Additionally, examining 
legitimacy provides insight into key factors of rebel success gained through external, state, and 
civilian actor involvement. This form of analysis allows for an evaluation of why actors host 
certain allegiances and provide assistance, and the weight such assistance has on rebel success. 
Ultimately, legitimacy frameworks warrant an examination into the voices of rebellion that are 
traditionally unheard, providing credit for their roles and justifications for decision-making in 
conflicts.  
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